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ABSTRACT 
 
Smaller Classes and Student Achievement:  
Three Papers Exploring the Class Size Effect. (May 2010) 
Courtney Amanda Collins, B.A., Rhodes College 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Li Gan 
 
 This dissertation analyzes the effect of smaller classes on student 
performance using student-level test score data from the state of Texas, focusing on 
three specific issues: heterogeneity in the returns to smaller classes across a score 
distribution of students, the relationship between class size and students’ moving 
decisions, and the connection between smaller classes and schools’ class division 
procedures.   
 I first examine evidence of heterogeneity in the returns to class size 
reductions across a score distribution of students.  I divide students into decile 
groups based on their previous year test scores, and I estimate the returns to 
smaller classes for each of the deciles.  The empirical evidence supports the 
hypothesis that there are significant differences in students’ responses to class size, 
based on their previous test scores. 
 I then model the class size effect simultaneously with students’ decisions to 
switch schools, which is important because movers compose a substantial fraction 
of the dataset, and because class size effects vary between movers and nonmovers.  
 iv 
Recognizing that students move for different reasons, only some of which are 
school-related, I present a two-type moving model in which students are 
categorized as endogenous movers or exogenous movers.  I estimate the model 
estimated using maximum likelihood.  The results reveal key biases in traditional 
estimates of the moving effect and suggest significant differences in the class size 
effect across mover types. 
 I also explore the class size effect in conjunction with schools’ decisions to 
sort students into different classes.  Using student-level data in which students are 
linked to specific classes, I disentangle the class size effect from the sorting effect.  
Including a variable indicating the sorting index of a school decreases the 
magnitude and significance of the class size effect.  I also examine different types of 
sorting.  The findings suggest that sorting students into more homogeneous groups 
is beneficial for both high and low scoring students.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The efficacy of school inputs has been a thoroughly studied topic, both in the 
economics literature and in other fields.  For decades, policymakers, researchers, 
and school administrators have attempted to understand the determinants of 
student achievement—to uncover the inputs that improve performance and those 
that have little or no effect at all.  The study of class size has been of particular 
interest, both in the academic literature and in statewide implementations.  Many 
have touted smaller class sizes as a key factor in raising the academic achievement 
of children, emphasizing that smaller classes allow for more individualized 
attention for each student and a more manageable classroom for teachers.  These 
factors may eventually lead to better performance on achievement tests, among 
other positive outcomes. 
 These potential benefits are associated with substantial costs, however.  
Smaller class sizes mean hiring new teachers and building additional classroom 
space.  Several states have poured millions of dollars into class size reduction 
policies.  In 1996, the state of California implemented statewide legislation that 
funneled $1 billion per year into class size reduction efforts.  In 2002, Florida 
passed an amendment that would require class size reduction efforts in excess of  
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of the Journal of Public Economics. 
 
  
2 
$16 billion.  Many other states have restrictions that govern maximum class sizes 
for some or all grades and students.   
 Because class size reduction policies are so costly, it is important to have a 
clear understanding of their benefits to students.  Although much research has been 
conducted relating to this topic, there are still several unaddressed issues which 
may affect the overall estimation of the class size effect.  This dissertation explores 
three specific questions regarding class size.   
First, I examine whether or not evidence exists of heterogeneity in the class 
size effect across a score distribution of students.  I assume that the marginal 
productivity of class size may vary across students, depending on their previous 
year testing score.  While I allow the marginal product of smaller classes to vary, I 
make no a priori assumption for its functional form.  It is possible that smaller 
classes are most beneficial to students at the top of the testing distribution; 
alternatively, students with very low previous year testing scores may gain the 
most from a reduction in class size.  It may also be the case that students near the 
middle of the distribution benefit most from smaller classes.   
In order to determine which of these assumptions best fits empirically, I 
examine student-level test score data from the Texas Assessment of Knowledge and 
Skills (TAKS) exam, the standardized test given to students in the Texas public 
school system each year.  I group students into deciles based on their previous year 
testing score and allow the returns to class size to vary across the score 
distribution.  I evidence supporting heterogeneity in the class size effect.  OLS and 
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2SLS estimates suggest that smaller classes are most effective for students whose 
scores fell in the lower end of the overall distribution in the previous year.  This 
result holds for both the math and the reading scores from the exam. 
The second question I examine relates the class size effect to students’ 
decisions to switch schools from one year to another.  A surprising number of 
students in the Texas dataset can be classified as a “mover,” or someone who 
transfers to a new school in the following year.  One third of students move at least 
once between grades 3 and 6, excluding any moves caused by a transition to middle 
school.  Fifteen percent of students in any given cohort are movers.  Because a 
substantial amount of mobility intrinsically affects school enrollment, and thus 
class size, it is important to model the moving effect simultaneously with the class 
size effect. 
I create a two-type mover model in which students are classified into two 
groups: endogenous movers, who move schools because of some school-related 
reason, and exogenous movers, who move schools because of a reason unrelated to 
school.  An endogenous mover might switch schools because his parents are 
unhappy with his current teacher, whereas an exogenous mover might switch 
schools because his father got a new job in a different city.   
The student-level TAKS data allows me to link a child to his school campus, 
his district, and his region of the state.  From this information, I create three groups 
of movers: campus movers, who switch schools but remain in the same district; 
district movers, who switch districts but remain in the same region; and region 
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movers, who move regions across the state of Texas.  I use these three transfer 
types to identify endogenous and exogenous movers.  My prior belief is that 
students who are more likely to be endogenous movers will be campus or district 
movers, while students who move regions will be more likely to be exogenous 
movers.  Using maximum likelihood estimation, I estimate the two-type moving 
effect simultaneously with the class size effect. 
The results suggest strong heterogeneity in the class size effect across 
moving types.  Most of the class size effect is driven by students who switch 
districts but remain in the same region of Texas, a result which is partially 
explained by the fact that district movers are more heavily composed of low scoring 
students.  I also find that simple OLS or 2SLS estimates of the moving effect are 
biased relative to the simultaneous MLE model. 
In the third paper, I attempt to disentangle the class size effect from schools’ 
ability to sort students into classes.  I assert that because schools with smaller 
classes necessarily have more classes, schools that use strategic sorting 
mechanisms will be able to sort more efficiently if they have smaller classes.  
Therefore, what is often labeled a class size effect may be confounded with schools’ 
sorting ability.   
In order to separate these two effects, I use a unique student-level data from 
Dallas ISD, which allows students to be tracked to their specific classes.  This is 
important because students can be linked to their classmates, and score 
distributions are available for individual classes, rather than at the grade level.  I 
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create a sorting index based on the difference in the standard deviations of scores 
of individual classes.  I then include this sorting index in a typical class size 
regression.  I find that adding the sorting variable significantly decreases the 
magnitude of the class size coefficient. 
I also explore different types of sorting and examine how they affect student 
test scores.  I find that sorting students into homogeneous groups based on test 
score is advantageous for all students—both high scoring students and low scoring 
students.  This mechanism appears to be significantly more beneficial than creating 
more heterogeneous groups with a balance of students from both the high and low 
end of the score distribution.   
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CHAPTER II 
CLASS SIZE AND STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT:  
EXPLORING HETEROGENEITY IN RETURNS TO CLASS SIZE REDUCTIONS 
 
II.1  Introduction 
The emphasis on student achievement as measured by test scores is 
becoming increasingly important in the United States, especially since the 
implementation of the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001.  Although most 
states had some form of standardized student assessment prior to the law, the 
legislation expanded statewide testing by mandating that each public school 
student in grades three through eight be tested in both reading and math every 
year.  The outcome of these tests play a major role not only in determining student 
promotion, but also in influencing schools’ federal funding and right to self-
administration.   
Although a few schools with exceptionally high-scoring student populations 
are largely unaffected by the new assessment standards, NCLB provides important 
incentives for most schools and districts.  For example, in 80 percent of Texas 
schools, at least half of all students in the seventh grade scored within 100 points of 
the passing threshold or below it.1 Similar statistics hold for other grades, 
indicating that a significant number of schools are strongly affected by incentives 
implemented by NCLB. 
                                                 
1 The mean of the test scores for the 7th graders is 2093 and the standard deviation is 246. 
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Such an emphasis on scores as a measure of achievement leads educators 
and policymakers to carefully evaluate how different measures of school inputs 
affect test scores.  If educators are able to examine school inputs (such as class size, 
teacher education, and spending) and evaluate which ones affect student 
performance the most, then they can use that information in a practical way to 
benefit actual achievement.  One of the most hotly-debated school input variables 
within both education circles and fields of economic analysis is class size.  Class size 
reduction has been touted by policymakers as a key component in raising measures 
of student achievement, and politicians and interest groups have advocated 
channeling funds toward programs that emphasize smaller classes, especially for 
disadvantaged students.  Currently, 40 states in the US have implemented programs 
or laws to limit class size or student/teacher ratios, at least for certain grades or 
groups of students.  Several states have funneled large amounts of money into 
statewide class size reduction programs.  The state of Florida, for example, is 
currently implementing a 2002 amendment that legislates class size maximums for 
every class in the state; to date, more than $16 billion have been spent to hire the 
additional teachers needed to comply with the law.   
However, despite the apparent popularity of this initiative, researchers have 
not come to a consensus on the merits and efficiency of smaller classes.  While 
some studies suggest class size reductions may increase student performance for 
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some grades2, others conclude that there is no solid evidence that smaller classes 
affect achievement in a meaningful way3.  I revisit the class size question in this 
paper by adding a key assumption to the typical model.  While most previous work 
has examined the average effect of class size (or any school input) on student 
achievement, I allow for the possibility of heterogeneity in returns to class size 
across a testing distribution of students.  I explore whether inputs that have little or 
no effect on average may have significant impacts for some parts of the distribution.  
I find evidence that class size returns do vary based on students’ previous score.  
 
II.2  Current Literature 
A large portion of the class size discussion centers around meta-analyses of 
the existing research.  Perhaps the most well-known of these studies is the work 
conducted by Hanushek (1986, 1997).  In the more recent study (1997), he 
analyzes 277 estimates from 59 studies that explore the effect of smaller classes on 
student achievement and that meet minimal quality requirements.  Giving equal 
weight to each estimate, he finds no evidence of a significant, systematic 
relationship between class size and student performance. 
 Krueger (2003) takes issue with Hanushek’s method of “vote counting” and 
contends that the proper procedure would be to give equal weight to each study 
rather than to each estimate.  He reevaluates Hanushek’s analysis and determines 
                                                 
2 Angrist and Lavy (1999), for example, find that smaller classes increase performance for 4th and 5th 
grade students, but not for 3rd graders. 
3 See Hoxby (2000) and Rivkin et al. (2005).  
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that if each published study were given equal weight, the results would support a 
significant relationship between smaller classes and student achievement.4 
Outside of the meta-analysis debate, there are several important studies 
whose methodologies produce interesting (and again, often conflicting) results.  
Angrist and Lavy (1999) address the potential endogeneity of class size by 
exploiting the discontinuity caused by maximum class size rules in Israel.  They 
create an instrument for class size based on the Israeli school system’s practice of 
limiting class size to 40 students (see section II.4.2 for a description of the 
instrument).  Their results indicate class size effects for some (but not all) students.  
They find, for example, that a one student reduction in class size is associated with 
an increase in average math score of 0.05 points (on a 100 point scale) and an 
increase in average reading score of 0.13 points.  They find significant effects for 
fourth and fifth graders, but not for third graders. 
 Hoxby (2000) uses maximum and minimum class size rules in Connecticut, 
combined with exogenous variation in the population of school-aged children, to 
identify the class size effect.  She finds no evidence that smaller classes increase 
student achievement, nor does she find that smaller classes are beneficial for 
schools with a higher proportion of minority or low-income students.   
 While much of the class size literature uses econometric techniques to deal 
with the endogeneity problems present in existing data, there are a few studies that 
                                                 
4 For a detailed description of both Hanushek and Krueger’s methodologies and arguments, see The 
Class Size Debate (Mishel and Rothstein, eds.). 
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are experimental in nature and involve random assignment.  The most important of 
these is the Tennessee Student Teacher Achievement Ratio (STAR) program, which 
marked the first large-scale study with an experimental design.5  Schools in 
Tennessee were given the option of participating in the program, which would 
randomly assign students to either small classes (13-17 students) or large classes 
(22-25 students).  These students were tracked from kindergarten through third 
grade and remained in either small or large classes.  Researchers found that 
students in small classes performed significantly better on a standardized test at 
the end of kindergarten and that the score gap continued, but did not widen, as 
those students continued through third grade.  
 The results of the study have been interpreted in several different ways.  
Many researchers point to the significant class size effect as strong evidence that 
smaller classes make a substantial difference in improving student performance.  In 
fact, this study was (and continues to be) one of the driving forces behind much of 
the state legislation aimed at reducing class size.  However, other researchers 
highlight the fact that while class size may be important for children in 
kindergarten, if the effect persisted in higher grades, the score gap should increase 
as children remained in small classes.   
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 See Word et al. (1990) for a complete description of the Tennessee STAR project. 
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II.3  A Model of Heterogeneity in the Class Size Effect Across a Score Distribution 
A typical model of the effect of school input, such as class size, on student 
achievement is given by the following equation: 
𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 −1 + 𝜂𝐶𝑗𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 , (II.1) 
 
where 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡   is the test score of student i in school j at time t, 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 −1 is student i’s score  
 in the previous year, 𝐶𝑗𝑡  is the class size (or other school input) within a grade at 
school j, and 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡   is a vector of student-specific demographic variables.  The error 
term 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡   is assumed to be independent and identically distributed.  The parameter 
𝜂 estimates the returns to a change in class size, on average.  A common result in 
the literature is that school inputs like class size have no significant effect on score 
gains, after controlling for relevant demographic variables.    
The key contribution of this paper is that I allow for the possibility of 
heterogeneity in returns to class size across the score distribution.  I assume that 
the marginal productivity of a class size reduction varies across a distribution of 
students, allowing students in different percentile groups to experience differential 
gains from the same class size reduction.  Intuitively, a student scoring at the 10th 
percentile level responds differently to a smaller class size than a student scoring at 
the 50th percentile level, and they both respond differently than a student scoring at 
the 90th percentile level.   
Although I assume that the marginal productivity of a class size reduction 
varies across a testing distribution, I do not make any assumptions about how it 
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varies.  Several possibilities may arise.  The marginal productivity may be 
increasing in test score, so that students at the top of the score distribution respond 
the most to a reduction in class size.  The opposite may also be true; if the marginal 
productivity function is decreasing in test score, then low scoring students have the 
most to gain from a class size reduction.  However, it is not necessary for marginal 
productivity to be linear in score; it may be concave or convex so that students in 
the center or at the ends of the distribution respond the most.  For now, I will only 
allow that differences in returns to class size exist, rather than assuming a specific 
functional form for the marginal productivity.   
I incorporate this assumption into the model by dividing students into decile 
groups based on their previous year scores.  I add dummy variables for each group 
into a typical model like equation (II.1): 
𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 −1 +  𝜂1𝑘
10
𝑘=1
𝐶𝑗𝑡 1 𝑝1𝑘 ≤ 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 −1 ≤ 𝑝2𝑘 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 𝜂2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  (II.2) 
 
where student i is sorted into group k if his score falls between two threshold 
scores,  𝑝1𝑘  and 𝑝2𝑘  .  Returns to class size are then allowed to vary by decile group.  
For the empirical results that follow, I divide students into ten groups, but it is also 
possible to analyze returns to fewer or more groups.   
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II.4  Texas Student-Level Data 
 I use student-level test score data obtained from the Student Assessment 
Division of the Texas Education Agency (TEA).  The dataset contains student 
mathematics and reading test scores from the Texas Assessment of Knowledge and 
Skills (TAKS) for grades three through eleven in 2004 and 2005.  Because Texas 
class size laws only apply to classes up to grade four, I use student test scores in 
grades three and four for the empirical analysis.  Each student in the dataset is 
assigned a unique student identification number, so that third graders’ individual 
scores in 2004 can be tracked to the corresponding fourth grade scores in 2005.  
Students’ grades, schools, and districts are known, although students cannot be 
linked to a specific class within a school.   
 I merge the TAKS score dataset by school with the Academic Excellence 
Indicator System (AEIS) report, also available from the TEA.  The AEIS report 
includes average class size for each grade in each Texas public school.  Although 
most classes are around 19 and 20, there is considerable variation across schools.  
The combined dataset also contains detailed demographic data at the student level, 
including gender, ethnicity, free or reduced lunch eligibility, migrant status, and 
ESL status.   
 Two scores for each student are reported in the dataset—a raw score and a 
scale score.  The raw score, which falls between 0 and 40, indicates the number of 
questions the student answered correctly on the exam.  The scale score is used to 
adjust for test difficulty across testing administrations and is calculated by the TEA 
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using a Rasch Partial-Credit Model (RPCM).  Scale scores fall between 1228 and 
2697 for the math exam and 1319 and 2614 for the reading exam.  Scale scores map 
one-to-one with the raw scores.  Although scales scores are meant to control for 
changes in difficulty across testing administrations, they are not meant to be 
vertically linked from one year to the next.  That is, a student’s third grade scale 
score in 2004 is not necessarily comparable to his fourth grade score in 2005.   
 Because neither of the provided scores can be vertically linked, I transform 
the scale scores into z-scores so that they can be compared from one year to the 
next.  The z-scores are defined in the following way: 
𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡 =
𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝜇 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑡 
𝜎 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑡 
 (II.3) 
 
where 𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the z-score of student i at school j in year t, 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the 
corresponding scale score, and 𝜇 and 𝜎 are the mean and standard deviation of the 
scale scores, calculated across the entire dataset.   
Summary statistics for all variables are reported in Table II.1.    
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Table II.1 
Summary statistics for TAKS test 
  Obs Mean St Dev Min Max 
Class Size 137389 19.7549 3.1857 3 48.4 
Math Score 131371 2263.45 187.15 1280 2684 
Previous Math Score 131371 2251.97 178.048 1228 2699 
Reading Score 139362 2241.47 170.467 1319 2614 
Previous Reading Score 139362 2294.18 154.169 1356 2588 
Female 139362 0.51239 0.49985 0 1 
Asian 139362 0.01447 0.1194 0 1 
Black 139362 0.1286 0.33476 0 1 
Hispanic 139362 0.37217 0.48339 0 1 
Free Lunch 139362 0.39368 0.48857 0 1 
ESL 139362 0.01651 0.12743 0 1 
Bilingual 139362 0.02611 0.15947 0 1 
GT 139362 0.03338 0.17963 0 1 
Special Ed 139362 0.00477 0.06891 0 1 
Average School Math 131371 2212.97 113.746 1324.81 2515.83 
Var School Math 131371 64829.8 46268 112.5 419740 
Average School Read 139362 2238 74.6046 1791 2519.33 
Var School Read 139360 24514.7 5999.54 0 225121 
Acc Rating 139362 2.54027 0.67914 1 4 
 
   
 
II.5  Potential Endogeneity of Class Size 
 There are at least two sources of potential endogeneity in the model 
described in equation (II.2)—measurement error and sorting error.  Endogeneity 
from measurement error may arise because the observed variable 𝐶𝑗𝑡  is average 
class size across the grades within a school, not actual class size for each student.  
(Even if actual class size data were available through the TEA, they would not be 
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useful because individual students cannot be linked to specific classes.)  
Endogeneity is present if actual class size varies systematically with student scores.  
 A second source of endogeneity stems from sorting based on test score.  For 
example, schools may sort low-ability students into smaller classes and high-ability 
students in larger classes, resulting in a positive correlation between ability and 
class size.  Since ability is positively correlated with score gain, the coefficient on 
class size in a typical OLS regression would be upward-biased.   The opposite result 
would transpire if schools sorted high-scoring students into smaller classes and 
low-scoring students into larger classes.   
 I propose two strategies to deal with potential endogeneity.  The first is to 
use maximum class size rules to develop an instrument for actual class size.  This 
instrument, proposed by Angrist and Lavy (1999), exploits the discontinuity in 
class size caused by maximum class size rules.  In the state of Texas, classes in 
kindergarten through grade 4 are allowed to have up to 22 students, but no more.  
When the number of students in a grade is equal to 22, then average class size is 22.  
However, one additional enrolled student triggers the maximum class size rule.  A 
school with 23 students in a grade is forced to add an additional class, and the 
average class size would be 11.5.  The actual instrument used in the analysis, 
predicted class size, is calculated as follows: 
𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑗𝑡 =
𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑡
int  
𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑡 − 1
22  + 1
 
(II.4) 
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where 𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑡  is equal to the total enrollment within a grade at school j in time t, 
and int(x) is the smallest integer greater than or equal to x.  Predicted class size is 
positively correlated with average class size, and there is no reason to believe that 
it should be correlated with the error term in equation (II.2).   
 I also include school-fixed effects as another method to try to reduce 
problems caused by endogeneity.  These fixed effects will account for any student-
invariant school-level heterogeneity, such as administrative style or overall school 
efficiency. 
 
II.6  Results 
II.6.1  Average Class Size Effects 
 The ultimate question to be examined is whether changes in class size affect 
students differently across the score distribution.  Before exploring any evidence of 
a differential impact on students, I first consider the average effect of a class size 
change.  Table II.2 shows the results of the regression of math score on class size.  
The OLS column represents the base regression, before including school fixed 
effects or instrumenting for class size.  In the absence of fixed effects, average 
school score and variance of school score are included to partially control for 
school quality.  Student demographic controls include race, gender, and economic 
disability.  
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Class Size -0.0004 (0.99) -0.0044 (1.97) **
Previous Score 0.4027 (237.83) *** 0.4027 (237.73) ***
Female -0.0149 (5.83) *** -0.0149 (5.83) ***
Asian 0.1527 (14.48) *** 0.1531 (14.51) ***
Black -0.0767 (16.68) *** -0.0747 (15.82) ***
Hispanic -0.0132 (3.87) *** -0.0124 (3.61) ***
Free Lunch -0.0522 (16.39) *** -0.0540 (16.21) ***
ESL 0.0853 (8.75) *** 0.0862 (8.83) ***
Bilingual -0.0195 (2.44) ** -0.0176 (2.19) **
Special Ed -0.1250 (7.43) *** -0.1238 (7.35) ***
GT 0.2576 (34.56) *** 0.2585 (34.59) ***
Average Score 0.0017 (90.54) *** 0.0017 (90.36) ***
Var Score 2.36E-06 (65.40) *** 2.35E-06 (64.30) ***
Acc Rating -0.0110 (4.53) *** -0.0108 (4.45) ***
R-squared 0.4941 0.4937
Obs 131371 131371
Table II.2
OLS 2SLS
Effect of class size on math score
  
 
 
Recall that the dependent variable is measured as a z-score.  The class size 
coefficient indicates that a one-student reduction in class size results in a 
statistically insignificant 0.0004 point increase in math z-score, on average.  In 
addition to being insignificant, the point estimate itself is very small.6  Most other 
coefficients have their expected signs.   
 Table II.2 also shows the results of the regression using predicted class size 
as an instrument for average class size.  The Donald-Cragg F-statistic for weak 
instruments is 4444.5, which is substantially higher than the critical value for a 
                                                 
6
 The mean scale score is 2231.72, and the standard deviation is 210.58.   
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weak instrument.  As predicted, the coefficient on class size is lower than the 
corresponding OLS coefficient, indicating that endogeneity causes an upward bias 
in the original estimate.  The 2SLS class size coefficient indicates that a one-student 
reduction in class size leads to a 0.0044 higher math z-score (.4 percent of a 
standard deviation) on average.    
 Table II.3 reports the same regressions for the reading exam.  The results 
are similar, except that reading scores seem to be even less responsive to class size 
reductions that math scores.  The baseline OLS results suggest that class size does 
not significant impact reading score.  (The point estimate itself is -0.00029, which is 
even smaller than the corresponding math effect.)  The magnitude of the coefficient 
increases as expected when predicted class size is used as an instrumental variable, 
but the estimate is still not significantly different from zero. 
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Class Size -0.0003 (0.47) -0.004 (1.08)
Previous Score 0.57588 (240.66) *** 0.57585 (240.60) ***
Female 0.06946 (15.84) *** 0.06945 (15.83) ***
Asian 0.18872 (10.23) *** 0.18915 (10.25) ***
Black -0.092 (11.70) *** -0.0906 (11.33) ***
Hispanic -0.0094 (1.61) -0.0085 (1.43)
Free Lunch -0.1177 (21.45) *** -0.1191 (21.02) ***
ESL -0.0428 (2.34) ** -0.0416 (2.27) **
Bilingual -0.0895 (5.86) *** -0.0879 (5.72) **
Special Ed -0.2475 (7.82) *** -0.2455 (7.75) ***
GT 0.48022 (38.52) *** 0.48134 (38.46) ***
Average Score 0.00322 (71.98) *** 0.00323 (71.30) ***
Var Score 8.51E-07 (2.29) ** 8.68E-07 (2.33) **
Acc Rating -0.0153 (3.60) *** -0.0151 (3.53) ***
R-squared 0.4599 0.4599
Obs 137389 137389
Table II.3
OLS 2SLS
Effect of class size on reading  score
 
  
 
The results from Tables II.2 and II.3 suggest that average class size effects 
are, at best, small in their impact on measures of students’ math achievement, and 
insignificant in their effect on reading scores.  This is consistent with evidence 
found in much of the literature (see Hoxby 2000 and Rivkin et al. 2005).  However, 
effects which are small or insignificant on average may be more important for 
certain groups of students.  Smaller classes may be beneficial for students who are 
performing particularly poorly or well in school, or they may be especially helpful 
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for students near the center of the distribution.  I now explore the data to test for 
these possibilities.  
 
II.6.2  Class Size Effects by Decile Group 
 I examine the effect of class size across a distribution of students by first 
dividing the students into decile groups based on their 2004 score.  I rank all third 
grade students within a campus based on their previous year scores, and then I 
divide students into ten decile groups based on those rankings.  (Note that because 
students’ scores tend to clump into groups, the deciles do not contain all contain 
exactly the same number of students.)  Decile 1 contains the bottom ten percent of 
students in every campus, decile 2 contains the next ten percent of students in 
every campus, and so on.  The deciles are included in the regression as dummy 
variables, so returns to class size are allowed to vary from group to group.  The 
additional controls included in the base regressions are included here as well.   
 Figure II.1 shows heterogeneity in class size returns by decile group for the 
math exam.  Each point on the table represents the coefficient estimate for returns 
to class size for each decile group.  Consider the OLS results first.  The largest (in 
magnitude) effects are for students in decile 1, or students at the low end of the 
previous year’s score distribution.  The effect decreases for the higher deciles, 
showing that the effect of smaller classes seems to be decreasing in previous test 
score.  The coefficient estimates are all significantly different from each other using 
an F test comparison, with the exception of groups 9 and 10.   
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Figure II.1.  Class size effect by decile groups (math score). 
 
 
 Figure II.1 also compares heterogeneity in class returns from the OLS 
regression with the corresponding IV estimates.   The IV estimates reflect the same 
shape illustrated in the OLS estimates; the main difference lies in the magnitude of 
the results.  Like the IV class size results without decile groups, these results are 
significantly larger in magnitude when compared with their OLS counterparts.   All 
of the estimates for the deciles groups are significantly different from each other.  
 Figure II.2 reports the returns to class size by decile groups for the 2SLS 
regression with fixed effects.  Because I am using school fixed effects in these 
regressions, I must exclude one of the decile groups to avoid perfect 
multicolinearity.  This means that the coefficients reflect the difference in class size 
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returns between deciles, but I cannot directly determine the level of returns.  In 
order to report actual returns for each group, I use the original 2SLS estimates from 
the base regressions (given in Table II.2) and add the estimated coefficients from 
the current regression.  That is, the shape of the returns in Figure II.2 is based on 
the fixed effects regression, but the level is only correct if we assume that adding 
the fixed effects does not change the base return.  The fixed effects estimates reveal 
a similar pattern to the previous results, although there do not seem to be 
pronounced differences for students in deciles 7-9.  These results also suggest that 
very high scoring students may benefit more than the OLS or 2SLS results indicate. 
 
 
 
Figure II.2.  Class size effect by decile groups with fixed effects (math score). 
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 Figures II.3 and II.4 report results for the class size heterogeneity 
estimations for the reading exam.  The conclusions are qualitatively similar to the 
math results.  Again, I find evidence of heterogeneity across the score distribution, 
with students in the lowest decile being the prime beneficiaries of smaller classes.  
All OLS decile estimates are statistically different from each other, except deciles 9 
and 10.   All 2SLS decile estimates are significantly different from each other, except 
deciles 8 and 9.  The fixed effect results reveal more of an inverse-U pattern, 
suggesting that smaller classes are most effective for students at the high end of the 
distribution, in addition to students at the very bottom of the distribution.    
 
 
 
Figure II.3.  Class size effect by decile groups (reading score). 
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Figure II.4.  Class size effect by decile groups with fixed effects (reading score). 
 
 
II.7  Conclusions and Future Work 
A clear analysis of the effects of class size reductions is necessary for 
researchers to be able to make policy recommendations regarding the allocation of 
school researchers.  While many states have implemented large-scale programs 
aimed at reducing class size, there is no strong consensus in the economics 
literature about the efficacy of such programs.  One reason may be that the 
marginal productivity of a class size reduction varies across students, or that 
smaller classes are more beneficial for certain groups of students than others.   
I propose a model that allows the returns to smaller classes to vary across a 
student score distribution.  Using student-level data from Texas and employing 
maximum class size rules as an instrument, I find strong evidence of heterogeneity 
-0.04
-0.035
-0.03
-0.025
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2
0
0
5
 R
e
a
d
in
g
 Z
 S
co
re
Decile Group
OLS
2SLS
2SLS with FE
  
26 
in the returns to smaller classes across the distribution.  I find that while the 
average effect of class size is small, students who are in the lowest previous score 
deciles are particularly responsive to decreases in class sizes.  This result holds for 
both the math and reading versions of the exam. 
This study provides evidence that the marginal productivity of a particular 
input (in this case, class size), is heterogeneous in its effect on different students.  
Future work will examine the possibility of heterogeneous effects for other school 
inputs, such as teacher education, teacher experience, or school expenditure. 
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CHAPTER III 
SWITCHING TO BETTER SCHOOLS:  
A MODEL OF CLASS SIZE AND MOVER ENDOGENEITY 
 
III.1  Introduction 
 In 2002, the Florida state legislature passed an amendment requiring 
schools across the state to reduce class sizes.  The new requirements, which created 
class size caps of 18 for kindergarten through third grade, 22 for fourth grade 
through eighth grade, and 25 for high school, were designed to be implemented in 
stages.  Since 2002, the state has spent $16 billion in an effort to reduce class sizes 
and will need to spend billions more if it intends to fully comply with the law by the 
2010-2011 school year.  
 The Florida legislation, while it is the largest statewide effort to reduce class 
size, is certainly not the first.  In 1996, the state of California voted to allocate $1 
billion per year to set a maximum class size of 20 for students in kindergarten 
through third grade.   Other states, such as Wisconsin and Tennessee, have 
participated in large-scale class size reduction efforts, and forty states currently 
have some type of policy limiting class size or student-teacher ratios for some or all 
grades.    
 Although extensive state and federal funds have been allocated for class size 
reduction policies, the economics literature identifying the benefits of these policies 
does not provide a strong basis of support for them.  Both the individual studies of 
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smaller classes and the meta-analyses of these studies yield contradictory results.   
Some of these contradictions are rooted in the endogeneity caused by students who 
switch from one school to another.  Because students and their families are able to 
transfer schools by choosing to locate in a different area, students are not randomly 
distributed across a region.  Moreover, movers account for a substantial subset of 
the population.  In Texas, almost 33 percent of students transfer schools at least 
once between third and sixth grades, excluding those who move because of a forced 
transition to middle school,7 and about 15 percent of students in any given grade 
are movers.  Given that such a large portion of the population engages in school 
transition and many of these moves may be driven by school characteristics, it is 
important to fully consider the moving decision when analyzing the class size effect, 
or the effect of any school input. 
In this paper, I propose a model that allows for two types of movers: 
endogenous movers who switch schools because of a desire to increase school 
quality, and exogenous movers who switch schools for some reason unrelated to 
school (such as a change in family structure or parents’ employment).  Different 
types of school changes—transfers within district, transfers across districts, and 
transfers across regions—are used to identify endogenous and exogenous movers.  
Using student-level standardized test data from Texas and school-level zip code 
characteristics, I implement a maximum likelihood model to simultaneously 
                                                 
7
 This statistic is based on Texas public school students who are third graders in 2003-2004 and 
sixth graders in 2006-2007.  It is consistent with Hanushek et al. (2004), who claim that one third of 
students switch schools at least once between fourth grade and seventh grade.   
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estimate the class size effect with the decision to switch from one school to another.  
This simultaneous estimation allows me to actually model the moving decision, 
rather than to simply control for movers, as previous studies have done.  I find that 
the endogeneity of the moving decision leads to a substantial bias in the estimation 
of the moving effect in a simple OLS model.  I also find that while the class size 
effect is small on average, it is heterogeneous in its effect on different types of 
movers.  Smaller classes are most beneficial for students who move across districts 
but within region.   
 
III.2  Current Literature 
III.2.1  Class Size Effects  
 A large portion of the class size discussion centers around meta-analyses of 
the existing research.  Perhaps the most well-known of these studies is the work 
conducted by Hanushek (1986, 1997).  In the more recent study (1997), he 
analyzes 277 estimates from 59 studies that explore the effect of smaller classes on 
student achievement and that meet minimal quality requirements.  Giving equal 
weight to each estimate, he finds no evidence of a significant, systematic 
relationship between class size and student performance. 
 Krueger (2003) takes issue with Hanushek’s method of “vote counting” and 
contends that the proper procedure would be to give equal weight to each study 
rather than to each estimate.  He reevaluates Hanushek’s analysis and determines 
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that if each published study were given equal weight, the results would support a 
significant relationship between smaller classes and student achievement.8 
Outside of the meta-analysis debate, there are several important studies 
whose methodologies produce interesting (and again, often conflicting) results.  
Angrist and Lavy (1999) address the potential endogeneity of class size by 
exploiting the discontinuity caused by maximum class size rules in Israel.  They 
create an instrument for class size based on the Israeli school system’s practice of 
limiting class size to 40 students (see section III.4.2 for a description of the 
instrument).  Their results indicate class size effects for some (but not all) students.  
They find, for example, that a one student reduction in class size is associated with 
an increase in average math score of 0.05 points (on a 100 point scale) and an 
increase in average reading score of 0.13 points.  They find significant effects for 
fourth and fifth graders, but not for third graders. 
 Hoxby (2000) uses maximum and minimum class size rules in Connecticut, 
combined with exogenous variation in the population of school-aged children, to 
identify the class size effect.  She finds no evidence that smaller classes increase 
student achievement, nor does she find that smaller classes are beneficial for 
schools with a higher proportion of minority or low-income students.   
 While much of the class size literature uses econometric techniques to deal 
with the endogeneity problems present in existing data, there are a few studies that 
                                                 
8 For a detailed description of both Hanushek and Krueger’s methodologies and arguments, see The 
Class Size Debate (Mishel and Rothstein, eds.). 
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are experimental in nature and involve random assignment.  The most important of 
these is the Tennessee Student Teacher Achievement Ratio (STAR) program, which 
marked the first large-scale study with an experimental design.  Schools in 
Tennessee were given the option of participating in the program, which would 
randomly assign students to either small classes (13-17 students) or large classes 
(22-25 students).  These students were tracked from kindergarten through third 
grade and remained in either small or large classes.  Researchers found that 
students in small classes performed significantly better on a standardized test at 
the end of kindergarten and that the score gap continued, but did not widen, as 
those students continued through third grade.  
 The results of the study have been interpreted in several different ways.  
Many researchers point to the significant class size effect as strong evidence that 
smaller classes make a substantial difference in improving student performance.  In 
fact, this study was (and continues to be) one of the driving forces behind much of 
the state legislation aimed at reducing class size.  However, other researchers 
highlight the fact that while class size may be important for children in 
kindergarten, if the effect persisted in higher grades, the score gap should increase 
as children remained in small classes.    
 
III.2.2  Moving Effects 
Much of the moving literature suggests that moving entails a substantial 
disruption cost for students and therefore has a negative effect on test score.  
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Ingersoll et al. (1989) find lower average achievement for movers when compared 
with nonmovers, especially for students in early grades.  They find that although 
the effect is mitigated by controls for socioeconomic status, substantial differences 
in achievement still exist between the two groups.  Kain and O’Brien (1999) 
estimate the effect of different types of moving on reading score using data from 
Texas.  They examine five types of moves (voluntary campus moves, structural 
campus moves, district moves, into sample state moves, and out of sample state 
moves), and find that most types of moves have a negative impact on score.  
Voluntary campus moves and state moves have the largest effects. 
Although many papers suggest a negative mobility effect, some research, 
particularly work on school choice, does report the opposite result.  For example, 
Cullen et al. (2005) explore the effects of mobility caused by the open enrollment 
system in Chicago Public Schools.  They find that high school students who move 
schools are more likely to graduate than their counterparts who remain in their 
previous schools.  However, the students who are more likely to switch schools 
appear to be systematically different from those who stay, leading to a spurious 
correlation.  (One exception is students who transfer to career academies; these 
students seem to genuinely benefit from the transfer choice.) 
Hanushek et al. (2004) consider students who transfer schools and attempt 
to disentangle the disruption cost of moving from the (presumably positive) effect 
of Tiebout movers, who move to better schools.  They use student-fixed effects and 
prior-year moves to identify the two effects.  They find that within-district movers 
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incur the highest disruption costs from moving, while students who move across 
districts but remain in the same region benefit from significantly higher school 
quality.  They also examine the negative externalities movers impose on other 
students, a problem which appears to be greater for minorities and economically 
disadvantaged students.  
 
III.3  A Two-Type Model of Moving 
A significant concern in modeling the class size effect arises because, to a 
large degree, students and their parents are able to choose which school they 
attend by choosing where they want to live.  According to the Tiebout choice model, 
individuals sort themselves into communities based on their preferences, and—at 
least for most families—schooling options are a significant component of the local 
community.  As a result, students are not randomly distributed across a region; 
instead, many choose to move to a particular area specifically because of the school 
characteristics it offers. 
This endogeneity problem is complicated by the fact that students move 
schools for many different reasons.  While some families locate in an area to allow 
their children to attend a preferred school, others move because of a change 
completely unrelated to schooling.  Students may switch schools because one of 
their parents gets a new job in a different part of the state or because of a change in 
family structure, such as a divorce.  Such moves are likely to be exogenous to school 
characteristics.  A complete model of class size should allow for different types of 
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movers in a simultaneous estimation of students’ decisions to switch schools, along 
with the class size effect.  
The following model allows students to belong to one of two types—the 
endogenous type, whose families move schools because of an unobserved school 
characteristic that may affect test score; and the exogenous type, whose families 
move schools because of a reason unrelated to school characteristics.  A picture of 
this two type model is shown in Figure III.1.  Student i belongs to the endogenous 
type (type N) and moves schools between periods t-1 and t if the following equation 
holds:  
𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 1 𝑍𝑖𝜂𝑁 + 𝜀𝑁𝑖 > 0 , (III.1) 
where 𝑍𝑖  is a vector of school and neighborhood characteristics that effect student 
i’s decision to move and 𝜀𝑁𝑖  is the error term.  A similar equation describes the 
moving decision of a student belonging to the exogenous type (type X):    
𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 1 𝑍𝑖𝜂𝑋 + 𝜀𝑋𝑖 > 0 , (III.2) 
The effect of class size cs of student i on his test score s in period t is given by 
𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 +  𝛾2𝑁𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑋𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑋𝑖𝑡  𝑐𝑠𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 , (III.3) 
where 𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 is his score in the previous period,  𝑋𝑖𝑡  is a vector of student-specific 
characteristics affecting test score, and 𝑢𝑖  is the error term.  The class size effect is 
allowed to differ between movers and non-movers, and also between movers of the 
two types. 
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Figure III.1.  Two-type mover model. 
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 If type N movers switch schools based on unobserved schooling 
characteristics that affect test score, then the error from the moving equation 𝜀𝑁𝑖  
and the error from the score equation 𝑢𝑖  will be correlated; however, the 
correlation between the two error terms should be zero for type X movers: 
𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝜀𝑁𝑖 , 𝑢𝑖 ≠ 0 (III.4) 
𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝜀𝑋𝑖 , 𝑢𝑖 = 0 (III.5) 
The relationship between the two errors for the endogenous movers is given by 
𝜀𝑁 = 𝜆𝑁𝑢 + 𝑣𝑁 , (III.6) 
where 𝜐𝑁~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜐𝑁
2 ) and the variance of the error is  
𝜎𝑣𝑁
2 = 1 − 𝜆𝑁
2 𝜎𝑢
2 (III.7) 
 Although I assume type X movers are exogenous, I test equation (III.5) 
empirically by allowing the errors to be correlated.  Therefore,   
𝜀𝑋 = 𝜆𝑋𝑢 + 𝑣𝑋 , (III.8) 
where 𝜐𝑋~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜐𝑋
2 ) and the variance of the error is  
𝜎𝑣𝑋
2 = 1 − 𝜆𝑋
2 𝜎𝑢
2. (III.9) 
When type X movers are truly exogenous, 𝜆𝑋 = 0, and the model collapses to the 
original assumption in equation (III.5). 
As shown in equations (III.1) and (III.2), both of the two types of students 
can choose to either move schools or to remain in their current school.  Therefore, 
each student falls into one of four categories: endogenous movers, endogenous 
stayers, exogenous movers, and exogenous stayers.  The probability that a type N 
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student i chooses to switch schools conditional on his test score 𝑠𝑖𝑡  is given by the 
following equation: 
Pr(𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 1  𝑠𝑖𝑡 = Pr 𝑍𝑖𝜂𝑁 + 𝜀𝑁𝑖 > 0 𝑠𝑖𝑡 . (III.10) 
Substituting with equation (III.6) and assuming  is normally distributed as 
described above yields 
Pr(𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 1  𝑠𝑖𝑡 = Pr 𝑍𝑖𝜂𝑁 + 𝜆𝑁𝑢 + 𝑣𝑁 > 0 𝑠𝑖𝑡 
= Φ  
𝑍𝑖𝜂𝑁 + 𝜆𝑁𝑢
 1 − 𝜆𝑁
2 𝜎𝑢2
 . 
(III.11) 
Finally, I substitute the error term 𝑢𝑖  from equation (III.3) to obtain: 
Pr(𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 1  𝑠𝑖𝑡 
= Φ  
𝑍𝑖𝜂𝑁 + 𝜆𝑁(𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 −  𝛾2𝑁𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑁𝑖𝑡  𝑐𝑠𝑖)
 1 − 𝜆𝑁
2 𝜎𝑢2
 . 
(III.12) 
The probability that a type N student i chooses not to switch schools is 
Pr(𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 0  𝑠𝑖𝑡 
= 1 − Φ  
𝑍𝑖𝜂𝑁 + 𝜆𝑁(𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 −  𝛾2𝑁𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑁𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑠𝑖)
 1 − 𝜆𝑁
2 𝜎𝑢2
 . 
(III.13) 
The other two conditional probabilities can be found in the same way.  The 
probability that a type X student i switches schools is given by 
Pr(𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 1  𝑠𝑖𝑡 
= Φ  
𝑍𝑖𝜂𝑋 + 𝜆𝑋(𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 −  𝛾2𝑋𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑋𝑖𝑡  𝑐𝑠𝑖)
 1 − 𝜆𝑋
2 𝜎𝑢2
 , 
(III.14) 
and the probability that a type X student i chooses to stay at his current school is  
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Pr(𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 0  𝑠𝑖𝑡 
= 1 − Φ  
𝑍𝑖𝜂𝑁 + 𝜆𝑁(𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 −  𝛾2𝑁𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑁𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑠𝑖)
 1 − 𝜆𝑁
2 𝜎𝑢2
 . 
(III.15) 
I can now multiply each of the conditional probabilities by the density of u to obtain 
each of the final densities: 
Case 1: 𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑡 , 𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 1 
= 𝛷  
𝑍𝑖𝜂𝑁 + 𝜆𝑁 𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 −  𝛾2𝑁𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑁𝑖𝑡  𝑐𝑠𝑖 
 1 − 𝜆𝑁
2 𝜎𝑢2
 
∗
1
𝜎𝑢
𝜙  
𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 −  𝛾2𝑁𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑁𝑖𝑡  𝑐𝑠𝑖
𝜎𝑢
  
(III.16) 
Case 2: 𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑡 , 𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 0 
=  1 − Φ  
𝑍𝑖𝜂𝑁 + 𝜆𝑁 𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 −  𝛾2𝑁𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑁𝑖𝑡  𝑐𝑠𝑖 
 1 − 𝜆𝑁
2 𝜎𝑢2
  
∗
1
𝜎𝑢
ϕ  
𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 −  𝛾2𝑁𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑁𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑠𝑖
𝜎𝑢
  
(III.17) 
Case 3: 𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑡 , 𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 1 
= Φ  
𝑍𝑖𝜂𝑋 + 𝜆𝑋(𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 −  𝛾2𝑋𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑋𝑖𝑡  𝑐𝑠𝑖)
 1 − 𝜆𝑋
2 𝜎𝑢2
 
∗
1
𝜎𝑢
ϕ 
𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 −  𝛾2𝑋𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑋𝑖𝑡  𝑐𝑠𝑖
𝜎𝑢
  
(III.18) 
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Case 4: 𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑡 , 𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 0 
=  1 − Φ  
𝑍𝑖𝜂𝑁 + 𝜆𝑁(𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 −  𝛾2𝑁𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑁𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑠𝑖)
 1 − 𝜆𝑁
2 𝜎𝑢2
  
∗
1
𝜎𝑢
ϕ  
𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 −  𝛾2𝑋𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑋𝑖𝑡  𝑐𝑠𝑖
𝜎𝑢
  
 
(III.19) 
 
Given equations (III.16)-(III.19), the log likelihood function for the 
maximum likelihood estimation is 
ℓ𝑖 =   log⁡(𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑘)
𝑁𝑘
𝑖=1
4
𝑘=1
. (III.20) 
 
III.4  Empirical Implementation of the Type-Specific Model 
III.4.1  Moving Model 
In order to empirically estimate this model, I must first identify which 
students belong to the endogenous type and which ones belong to the exogenous 
type.  My dataset, which is described in section III.5, allows me to link a student to 
his campus, district, and region in each period.  Using this information, I create 
three groups of students: campus movers (students who move schools within a 
district), district movers (students who move across districts but remain in the 
same region), and region movers (students who move across regions of the state).   
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Figure III.2.  Three-type mover model. 
   
All Students 
Potential Campus  
Movers 
Potential District  
Movers 
Campus  
Movers 
move 
stay 
stay 
Potential  
Region Movers 
District  
Stayers 
Region  
Stayers 
Campus  
Stayers 
District  
Movers 
Region  
Movers 
move 
stay 
move 
  
41 
It is likely that students in these different groups move for different reasons.  
Endogenous movers, who switch schools because of school-related characteristics, 
are likely to be students who move within region.  A student who is unhappy with 
his current school will probably look first for a different option nearby; it is unlikely 
that he and his family will move across the state to find a suitable alternative.  
Exogenous movers who switch schools because of some reason unrelated to school, 
such as a parent’s new job or a change in family structure, are more likely to 
include those students who move across regions. 
Students who move within a district are probably endogenous movers, but 
as Hanushek et al. (2004) conclude, the effects of moving for these students are 
different than the effects for across-district, within-region movers.  This is because 
students who change schools but remain in the same district are still subject to the 
same common administration and financing they experienced prior to the move.   
In the empirical implementation, I alter the two-type model described above 
to include instead the three groups of students described above: campus movers 
(type 1), district movers (type 2), and region movers (type 3).9  A picture of this 
three-type model is shown in Figure III.2.  I simultaneously estimate students’ 
decisions to make these three different types of moves with the class size effect.  
The moving decisions are given by the following three equations: 
                                                 
9
 Note that the three types are mutually exclusive.  Although district movers obviously also move 
campuses, I define “campus mover” to mean students who move campuses within a district, “district 
mover” to mean students who move districts within a region, and “region mover” to mean students 
who move across regions. 
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Campus Mover:                                        𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒1𝑖𝑡 = 1 𝑍𝑖𝜂1 + 𝜀1𝑖 > 0  (III.21) 
District Mover:                                        𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒2𝑖𝑡 = 1 𝑍𝑖𝜂2 + 𝜀2𝑖 > 0  (III.22) 
Region Mover:                                          𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒3𝑖𝑡 = 1 𝑍𝑖𝜂3 + 𝜀3𝑖 > 0   (III.23) 
The score equation is given by 
𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖
+  𝛾21𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾22𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾23𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒3𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑠𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 , 
(III.24) 
 
where returns to class size are allowed to vary across moving type.  The densities 
for the empirical estimation are derived as they are for the two type model above.  
Although I assume that region movers are exogenous, I allow for the correlation of 
the moving error and the score error for all three types so that I can test the 
exogeneity assumption empirically.  (See Appendix A for a complete description of 
the three type model.)  
 
III.4.2  Class Size  
 An additional concern in the estimation process is that the variable I use for 
class size is average class size within a grade, within a school.  This introduces 
measurement error, because a student’s actual class size is not equal to the average 
class size unless schools divide students into classes of exactly equal size.  Consider 
the true class size model, represented by 𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑗
∗ :  
𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑗
∗ = 𝑐𝑠𝑗    + 𝜀𝑖𝑗  (III.25) 
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Then the true score equation, simplified for convenience, is given by 
𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 −1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛾𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑗
∗ + 𝑢𝑖𝑗  
= 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 −1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛾(𝑐𝑠𝑗    + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 ) + 𝑢𝑖𝑗  
= 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 −1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛾𝑐𝑠𝑗    + 𝛾𝜀𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗  
(III.26) 
The measurement error will cause the typical attenuation effect if the following 
condition holds: 
𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝑐𝑠𝑗    , 𝜀𝑖𝑗  < 0 (III.27) 
The covariance between these terms would be negative if schools with higher 
average class sizes have less ability to create individual classes of different sizes.  
This is likely true because Texas has a maximum class size rule of 22 for all classes 
in kindergarten through grade 4.  A school with an average class size of 21 or 22 is 
constrained in the way it can move students between classes.  There is not much 
leeway to create any small classes within the grade because the extra students 
would push the larger classes over the maximum size.  However, a school with a 
smaller average class size of 17 or 18 would have more room to create relatively 
larger and smaller classes, causing a negative covariance between average class 
size and the error term.  Under this assumption, the class size coefficient will be 
biased towards zero.  
To mitigate the endogeneity caused by this problem, I create an instrument 
for class size based on maximum class size rules.  This type of instrument was first 
introduced by Angrist and Lavy (1999), who use Israel’s maximum class size rule of 
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40 to create a class size IV.  The maximum class size rule of 22 in Texas creates a 
discontinuity that can be exploited to create a predicted class size variable, based 
on school enrollment.  I define predicted class size in school j as 
𝑝𝑐𝑠𝑗 =
𝑒𝑗
int  
𝑒𝑗 − 1
22  + 1
, 
(III.28) 
where 𝑒𝑗  is the total enrollment of school j within a grade.  The expression 
int  
𝑒𝑗−1
22
  represents the largest integer that is less than or equal to the value in 
parentheses.   
Discontinuities arise in 𝑝𝑐𝑠𝑗  when enrollment increases to the point where 
the maximum class size rule is triggered and the school must create an additional 
class.  For example, if 𝑒𝑗  is equal to 44, then 𝑝𝑐𝑠𝑗  is equal to 22.  The students are 
divided into two classes, each with 22 students.  However, as soon as 𝑒𝑗  increases to 
45, the maximum class size rule is triggered, and a third class must be added.  Now 
𝑝𝑐𝑠𝑗  is equal to 15; the 45 students are divided into three classes, each with 15 
students.  This variable can be used as an instrument for class size; even if the 
maximum class size rules are not strictly enforced for every class,  𝑝𝑐𝑠𝑗  should be 
correlated with 𝑐𝑠𝑗 , yet there is no reason to believe it will be correlated with the 
error in the score equation.      
To simplify the model, I run the first stage of the 2SLS procedure first and 
obtain the predicted value of class size, 𝑐𝑠𝑗 .  I then use 𝑐𝑠𝑗  as the key variable of 
interest in the maximum likelihood estimation.  
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Table III.1 
Summary statistics of fourth grade students in 2004-2005 
  Mean St Dev Min Max Obs 
Class Size 18.612 4.44 1 48.4 131371 
Move 0.1490 0.3561 0 1 131371 
Move Campus 0.0744 0.2624 0 1 131371 
Move District 0.0543 0.2266 0 1 131371 
Move Region 0.0203 0.1411 0 1 131371 
Math Scale Score 2263.45 187.15 1280 2684 131371 
Previous Math Scale Score 2251.97 178.05 1228 2699 131371 
Female 0.5086 0.4999 0 1 131371 
Asian 0.0153 0.1229 0 1 131371 
Black 0.1317 0.3382 0 1 131371 
Hispanic 0.3599 0.4800 0 1 131371 
Free Lunch 0.3904 0.4879 0 1 131371 
Gifted/Talented 0.0320 0.1759 0 1 131371 
Special Ed 0.0058 0.0761 0 1 131371 
ESL 0.0186 0.1351 0 1 131371 
Bilingual 0.0282 0.1654 0 1 131371 
Average School Score 2212.97 113.746 1324.81 2515.83 131371 
Variance School Score 64829.78 46268 112.5 419740 131371 
Charter 0.0044 0.0660 0 1 131371 
Accountability Rating 2.5516 0.6797 1 4 131371 
  
 
III.5  Student-level Data from Texas 
III.5.1  Moving Data 
For the estimation, I use student-level data from the Texas Assessment of 
Knowledge and Skills (TAKS) obtained from the Texas Education Agency (TEA).  
Summary statistics for all variables are shown in Table III.1.  I use the universe of 
fourth grade students who attended public school in Texas during the 2004-2005 
school year and who also appear in the dataset during the previous school year. 
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The data allows a researcher to track a student to his grade, campus, district, 
and region (but not to his specific class).  I use the campus, district, and region 
identifiers from the 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 school years to construct the 
following moving variables:  
𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒1𝑖𝑡 = 1 if 𝑐𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡 ≠ 𝑐𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 and 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 (III.29) 
𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒2𝑖𝑡 = 1 if 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 ≠ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 and 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 (III.30) 
𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒3𝑖𝑡 = 1 if 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 ≠ 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 (III.31) 
I exclude a student from the type 1 moving group (campus movers) if he is 
forced to move campuses due to a middle school transition and remains within his 
district; that is, if the highest grade in 𝑐𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡−1was third grade.  I do not make 
this adjustment for the other two groups; if a student moves across districts or 
regions, he is considered a mover even if he was forced out of his previous campus. 
The region variable included in the dataset refers to a student’s Educational 
Service Center (ESC) region.  Each school district falls into one of the twenty ESC 
regions across the state.  It is important to note that although the twenty regions 
are general approximations of broad geographic areas across Texas, their specific 
boundaries are somewhat arbitrary and do not match exactly with more 
conventional measures of regions, such as MSAs.  An alternative method of division 
would be to link districts directly to MSAs, which might provide a more reasonable 
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approximation of regional labor markets.  In the current estimation, however, 
“region” refers to ESC region as provided in the dataset.       
 
III.5.2  Score Data 
 I use a student’s math score on the TAKS test as the dependent variable in 
the score regression.  The dataset includes a unique student identifier which allows 
students’ scores to be linked from one year to the next, so I also control for a 
student’s previous year test score.  By controlling for previous score, my 
specification becomes a “value added” model.   
 The TEA reports two types of scores for each student.  The first is the raw 
score, which simply reports the number of questions the student answered 
correctly.  The second score is the scale score, which is a transformation of the raw 
score used control for the difficulty of the exam across administrations so that 
scores can be compared across years.  For example, scale scores could be used to 
compare the scores of third graders who took the exam in 2004 with the scores of 
the next cohort of third graders who took the exam in 2005.   
Neither the raw score nor the scale score is meant to be vertically linked; 
that is, they should not be used to compare a third grader’s 2004 score with that 
same student’s fourth grade score in 2005.  Because that is exactly the comparison I 
want to make, I convert scale scores into z scores by subtracting the mean and 
dividing by the standard deviation.  Therefore, the dependent variable in the model 
is  
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𝑠𝑖𝑡 =
𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 − 𝜇𝑡
ςt
, (III.32) 
where 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡  is student i’s scale score in period t, and 𝜇𝑡  and ςt  represent the mean 
and standard deviation of the scale scores.  A student’s score is now a 
representation of where he lies along the distribution of scores.  I generate z scores 
for both the current year and the previous year.  
 
III.5.3  Class Size 
 As explained in section III.4.2, I use average class size within a grade, within 
a school to capture class size effects.  The TEA only reports average class size; 
actual class size for each student is not available.  Even if comprehensive data on 
actual class size were reported, I would not be able to identify a specific student’s 
actual class size because the TAKS data tracks a student to his grade and campus, 
but not to his specific class or teacher.  Therefore, I use average class size as 
reported in the Academic Excellence Indicator System (AEIS).  This data, which is 
reported by campus, is merged with the TAKS student-level data.  Enrollment data 
is also available through AEIS, which I use to generate an instrumental variable for 
class size, as described in section III.4.2.   
 Other student-level controls available through the TAKS data include a 
student’s gender, race, ESL status, and bilingual status.  There are also variables 
indicating whether a student is enrolled in a gifted and talented program or a 
special education program, and whether or not he is eligible for free or reduced 
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lunch.  Additional school-level controls, such as a school’s accountability rating, are 
available through the AEIS dataset.   In Texas, schools are divided into one of four 
categories: exemplary, recognized, academically acceptable, and academically 
unacceptable.  This rating, as well as average school score and variance of school 
score are included as campus-level controls in the score regressions. 
 
III.5.4  Neighborhood Characteristics 
 The moving decisions described in equations (III.21)-(III.23) create the need 
for information on neighborhood characteristics, in addition to school 
characteristics.  I use zip code data from the US census, and merge this data with 
the school characteristics by the zip code of the campus.  (One limitation of the 
study is that I do not have information on students’ addresses or zip codes, so I 
cannot link the zip code data to students and their families directly.  However, 
because most schools are neighborhood schools, I assume that characteristics of 
the school neighborhood will be similar to characteristics of the student’s own 
neighborhood, even if the zip codes differ.)   
The dataset includes demographic and economic variables such as total 
population, population broken down by race groups, median age, average housing 
value, and average income per household.   I merge these data to a student’s 
campus in both period t and period t-1, which allows me to explore which kinds of 
neighborhoods students leave and which kinds of neighborhoods students enter 
when they switch schools. 
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III.6  Results 
III.6.1  Differences Between Movers and Nonmovers 
 Before beginning the regression analysis, I first examine basic differences 
between movers and nonmovers.  Table III.2 reports selected summary statistics by 
moving type and shows mean comparison tests between movers and nonmovers.  
The full dataset includes 131,371 fourth graders whose scores can be matched 
between the 2003-2004 school year and the 2004-2005 school year.10  Of these 
students, about 85 percent remain in the same school both years (or switch to a 
different campus within their district because their 2003-2004 school only served 
students through the third grade).  Of the 15 percent of students who move schools, 
about 7.5 percent are classified as campus movers (who switch campuses within 
their district), 5.5 percent are classified as district movers (who switch districts 
within their region), and 2 percent are classified as region movers (who switch 
regions within the state of Texas).    
                                                 
10
 Students whose scores cannot be matched may have moved out of the state of Texas or entered a 
private school.  Alternatively, they may still be in Texas public schools but were absent for testing. 
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Table III.2 
Mean comparison tests between nonmovers and movers 
  Nonmovers Campus Movers District Movers Region Movers 
 
Mean Mean 
Difference from 
Nonmovers Mean 
Difference from 
Nonmovers Mean 
Difference from 
Nonmovers 
Score 2271.1 2224.7 -46.5 *** 2203.2 -68.0 *** 2244.0 -27.1 *** 
   
(23.61) 
  
(29.87) 
  
(7.43) 
 Female 0.507 0.515 0.008 
 
0.518 0.012 * 0.530 0.023 ** 
   
(1.52) 
  
(1.88) 
  
(2.39) 
 Asian 0.017 0.008 -0.009 *** 0.007 -0.010 *** 0.006 -0.010 *** 
   
(6.61) 
  
(6.60) 
  
(4.16) 
 Black 0.118 0.204 0.086 *** 0.247 0.129 *** 0.116 -0.003 
 
   
(24.64) 
  
(31.94) 
  
(0.41) 
 Hispanic 0.356 0.433 0.077 *** 0.347 -0.009 
 
0.305 -0.050 *** 
   
(15.27) 
  
(1.46) 
  
(5.35) 
 White 0.509 0.354 -0.155 *** 0.398 -0.112 *** 0.571 0.062 *** 
   
(29.43) 
  
(18.29) 
  
(6.35) 
 Free Lunch 0.373 0.513 0.139 *** 0.486 0.113 *** 0.414 0.041 *** 
   
(27.27) 
  
(19.06) 
  
(4.33) 
 ESL 0.019 0.023 0.004 *** 0.013 -0.006 *** 0.010 -0.008 *** 
   
(3.10) 
  
(3.65) 
  
(3.12) 
 Bilingual 0.029 0.036 0.008 *** 0.015 -0.013 *** 0.009 -0.020 *** 
   
(4.27) 
  
(6.68) 
  
(6.08) 
 Gifted/Talented 0.036 0.015 -0.021 *** 0.006 -0.030 *** 0.012 -0.024 *** 
   
(10.99) 
  
(13.41) 
  
(6.66) 
 Special Ed 0.006 0.005 -0.001 * 0.002 -0.004 *** 0.003 -0.003 ** 
      (1.73)     (4.69)     (2.11)   
Observations 111800 9772 7131 2668 
 Note: Absolute values of t-statistics appear in parentheses beneath the difference. 
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Table III.3  
Mean comparison tests (difference in school characteristics between current school and previous school) 
  Nonmovers Campus Movers District Movers Region Movers 
  
Current-
Previous 
Current-
Previous 
Difference 
from 
Nonmovers 
Current-
Previous 
Difference 
from 
Nonmovers 
Current-
Previous 
Difference from 
Nonmovers 
Class Size 0.5661 0.5549 -0.0112 
 
0.5296 -0.0365 
 
0.4478 -0.1183 * 
   
(0.3102) 
  
(0.8720) 
  
(1.8108) 
 Acc Rating -0.2666 -0.1860 0.0805 *** -0.2141 0.0524 *** -0.2235 0.0430 *** 
   
(10.9971) 
  
(6.0739) 
  
(3.1638) 
 Average Score -25.0487 -23.5163 1.5324 * -18.7330 6.3157 *** -18.5553 6.4934 *** 
   
(1.6819) 
  
(5.9093) 
  
(3.8617) 
 Per. Asian 0.0002 0.0003 0.00003 
 
0.0002 -0.0001 
 
-0.0012 -0.0014 *** 
   
(0.1449) 
  
(0.2281) 
  
(4.2892) 
 Per. Black -0.0003 -0.0033 -0.0030 *** -0.0290 -0.0287 *** -0.0100 -0.0097 *** 
   
(5.4592) 
  
(37.8927) 
  
(11.2458) 
 Per. Hispanic 0.0120 0.0056 -0.0065 *** -0.0113 -0.0233 *** -0.0102 -0.0222 *** 
   
(9.9246) 
  
(27.5166) 
  
(19.0056) 
 Per. Free Lunch 0.0173 0.0028 -0.0145 *** -0.0244 -0.0418 *** -0.0099 -0.0272 *** 
   
(16.5892) 
  
(33.8047) 
  
(17.0370) 
 Per. G/T 0.0125 0.0105 -0.0021 *** 0.0083 -0.0043 *** 0.0105 -0.0021 *** 
   
(5.1234) 
  
(8.7359) 
  
(2.8932) 
 Per. Special Ed 0.0032 0.0023 -0.0008 
 
0.0047 0.0015 ** 0.0049 0.0017 * 
    
 
(1.5854)   
 
(2.4976)   
 
(1.7808)   
Note:  This table examines the mean difference between the current school characteristic and its previous year value.  This value is then 
compared against the same change for nonmovers.  Absolute values of t-statistics appear in parentheses beneath the difference.   
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The mean comparison tests show that, on average, movers of all types have 
lower testing scores than nonmovers.  Campus movers are more likely to be black 
or Hispanic (when compared to nonmovers), district movers are more likely to be 
black, and region movers are more likely to be white.  Movers of all types are more 
likely to qualify for free or reduced lunch.    
In addition to exploring differences between movers and nonmovers, I also 
examine which types of schools movers are likely to choose as their destination 
campuses.  Table III.3 provides mean comparison tests for the differences in school 
characteristics across the two years between movers and nonmovers.  For example, 
change in average school score for campus movers is compared to change in 
average school score for nonmovers to explore whether students switch to schools 
that are relatively better or worse in terms of score than their nonmover 
counterparts.    
The data suggest that students move to schools with better accountability 
ratings and higher scores than their previous schools.  (Because average 
accountability ratings and average test scores both decrease across the period, this 
means that the destination schools have ratings and scores that are “less low” than 
they would be had the student stayed in the previous school.)  The gap in test score 
is largest for district and region movers, who move to schools with an average test 
score drop of only about 19 points, compared with nonmovers, whose schools 
sustain a 25 point drop on average.  Examining differences in race and economic 
composition is also interesting.  Across the period, there is an increase in the 
54 
 
 
percent of Hispanic students across schools, but a relatively smaller increase in the 
percent of Hispanic students at the destination schools of all types of movers 
(compared to their origin schools).  The percent of students who qualify for free 
lunch increases across all schools, but the increase is relatively smaller for movers’ 
destination schools.  In fact, for district movers, there is actually a net decrease in 
the percent of students who qualify for free lunch of 2.4 percentage points.        
Tables III.4A and III.4B show the results of a probit regression for the 
moving decision using student characteristics as regressors.  These more formal 
results support the generalities suggested by the comparison tests.  Table III.4A 
shows the moving decision in general, in addition to campus, district, and region 
moves.  Movers in general are more likely to have lower previous scores, be black 
or Hispanic, and qualify for free lunch.  Specifically, campus movers are more likely 
to be black or Hispanic, district movers are more likely to be black, and region 
movers are more likely to be white.  Table III.4B shows campus, district, and region 
move probit regressions conditional on moving to allow comparisons between 
moving types.  Table III.4B suggests that students who are more likely to move 
districts have particularly low previous scores, when compared to campus or 
region movers. 
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Table III.4A  
Probit of moving decision on student characteristics  (unconditional campus, district, and region moves) 
  Move Campus Move District Move Region Move 
Previous Score -0.1005 (18.11) *** -0.0530 (7.89) *** -0.1149 (15.41) *** -0.0628 (6.06) *** 
Female 0.0104 (1.21) 
 
0.0055 (0.53) 
 
0.0032 (0.28) 
 
0.0275 (1.71) 
 Asian -0.2453 (5.69) *** -0.1296 (2.48) ** -0.2069 (3.34) *** -0.3591 (3.98) *** 
Black 0.3029 (22.09) *** 0.3063 (18.30) *** 0.3173 (18.14) *** -0.2269 (8.15) *** 
Hispanic 0.0728 (6.66) *** 0.1778 (13.28) *** 0.0214 (1.45) 
 
-0.1880 (9.22) *** 
Free Lunch 0.1311 (12.99) *** 0.1193 (9.72) *** 0.0709 (5.28) *** 0.1124 (5.88) *** 
G/T -0.4095 (12.33) *** -0.2159 (5.64) *** -0.5519 (9.47) *** -0.3672 (5.53) *** 
Special Ed -0.2417 (3.74) *** 0.0036 (0.05) 
 
-0.4793 (4.27) *** -0.3146 (2.36) ** 
ESL -0.1862 (5.66) *** -0.0343 (0.93) 
 
-0.2834 (5.79) *** -0.2633 (3.55) *** 
Bilingual -0.1426 (5.24) *** 0.0482 (1.61)   -0.3185 (7.41) *** -0.4057 (5.46) *** 
Note: Absolute values of z-statistics are in parentheses.   
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Table III.4B 
Probit of moving decision on student characteristics (conditional campus, district, 
and region moves) 
  Campus Move District Move Region Move 
Previous Score 0.0670 (5.79) *** -0.0722 (6.12) *** 0.0041 (0.28) *** 
Female -0.0019 (0.11) 
 
-0.0117 (0.63) 
 
0.0257 (1.12) 
 Asian 0.2135 (2.00) ** -0.0310 (0.28) 
 
-0.3014 (2.19) ** 
Black 0.1445 (5.33) *** 0.1665 (6.09) *** -0.5821 (15.95) *** 
Hispanic 0.2752 (12.06) *** -0.0709 (3.05) *** -0.3532 (12.53) *** 
Free Lunch 0.0488 (2.37) ** -0.0617 (2.95) *** 0.0160 (0.61) 
 G/T 0.4707 (5.27) *** -0.4619 (4.69) *** -0.1372 (1.27) 
 Special Ed 0.5965 (3.72) *** -0.5330 (3.03) *** -0.2241 (1.13) 
 ESL 0.3283 (4.57) *** -0.2629 (3.50) *** -0.1963 (1.95) * 
Bilingual 0.5168 (8.23) *** -0.3795 (5.81) *** -0.4436 (4.51) *** 
Note: Absolute values of z-statistics are in parentheses.  Campus, district, and 
region moves are conditional on moving.   
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These regressions, along with the simple t-test comparisons, reveal stark 
differences between students who remain in their current schools and those who 
switch.  In addition, it appears that the schools to which they transfer are 
systematically different from their previous schools.  This suggests that rather than 
simply controlling for students who move, researchers should carefully model the 
moving decision in conjunction with any school input effects, such as class size. 
 
III.6.2  Class Size Effect: OLS and 2SLS 
 Before running the full MLE model where the moving decision is modeled, I 
first report results for the simple OLS and 2SLS using the predicted class size 
instrument.  The first column in Table III.5 reports the results from a simple 
regression of math score on average class size, controlling for student and school 
level variables.  (In this regression, and in all following specifications, score is 
measured as a z score, as described in section III.5.2.)  The class size effect is 
negative, small, and insignificant in this specification.  Other variables have their 
expected values.  The third column reports results for an identical regression with 
an added dummy variable equal to 1 if the student moves schools in the previous 
period.  Again, class size is insignificant.  The moving variable, however, is 
significant and negative, suggesting that, on average, movers’ scores are 0.0397 
standard deviations lower than non-movers.  
  
  
5
8
 
Effect of class size on math score with and without move dummy
Class Size -0.0018 (0.99) -0.0212 (2.16) ** -0.0016 (0.90) -0.0229 (2.34) **
Move -0.0397 (10.99) *** -0.0394 (10.89) ***
Prev Score 0.4027 (237.84) *** 0.4027 (237.73) *** 0.4019 (237.20) *** 0.4019 (237.07) ***
Female -0.0149 (5.82) *** -0.0149 (5.82) *** -0.0148 (5.79) *** -0.0148 (5.79) ***
Asian 0.1530 (14.52) *** 0.1535 (14.55) *** 0.1516 (14.38) *** 0.1521 (14.42) ***
Black -0.0763 (16.58) *** -0.0742 (15.70) *** -0.0735 (15.95) *** -0.0711 (15.05) ***
Hispanic -0.0133 (3.88) *** -0.0124 (3.61) *** -0.0128 (3.77) *** -0.0119 (3.46) ***
Free Lunch -0.0523 (16.42) *** -0.0543 (16.30) *** -0.0512 (16.06) *** -0.0533 (16.01) ***
GT 0.2576 (34.55) *** 0.2585 (34.59) *** 0.2554 (34.26) *** 0.2564 (34.31) ***
Sp Ed -0.1251 (7.43) *** -0.1237 (7.34) *** -0.1268 (7.54) *** -0.1253 (7.44) ***
ESL 0.0853 (8.75) *** 0.0863 (8.84) *** 0.0835 (8.57) *** 0.0847 (8.68) ***
Bilingual -0.0195 (2.45) ** -0.0174 (2.17) ** -0.0209 (2.62) *** -0.0186 (2.31) **
Avg Score 0.3329 (90.43) *** 0.3335 (90.26) *** 0.3325 (90.34) *** 0.3331 (90.17) ***
Var Score 0.1460 (65.32) *** 0.1453 (64.23) *** 0.1456 (65.17) *** 0.1449 (64.05) ***
Charter -0.0331 (1.71) * -0.0321 (1.65) * -0.0278 (1.43) -0.0267 (1.38)
Acc Rating -0.0072 (4.55) *** -0.0071 (4.46) *** -0.0073 (4.59) *** -0.0071 (4.49) ***
Constant 0.1462 (17.34) *** 0.2324 (5.34) *** 0.1507 (17.87) *** 0.2450 (5.63) ***
R-squared 0.4941 0.4937 0.4945 0.4941
Cragg-Donald 4523.65 4531.04
N=131,371
Note : Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses.  All non-binary variables are measured in standard deviations from the 
mean.
Table III.5
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
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 Because of the potential measurement error that develops when using 
average test score, I use Texas’ maximum class size rules to generate an instrument 
for class size, which should correct for the bias in the OLS estimates.  The second 
and fourth columns in Table III.5 report the results from a 2SLS regression of test 
score on class size, using the predicted class size instrument described in section 
III.4.2.  The fourth column includes an additional moving dummy.  As expected, the 
estimates reveal that OLS appears to be biased upward; estimation with the 
instrumental variable produces a class size effect that is substantially more 
negative than the OLS estimation.  While these effects are still small, they are both 
statistically significant and about 12-14 times larger in magnitude than the OLS 
results.  A one standard deviation in class size, or about a four student reduction, 
results in a score increase of 0.0229 standard deviations.11   
 I also examine class size effects using interactions with different types of 
movers.  Table III.6 reports OLS and 2SLS estimates for class size interacted with 
three different dummy variables—students who move within their own district 
(type 1), students who move across districts but within their own region (type 2), 
and students who move across regions (type 3).   
 
                                                 
11 The standard deviation of average class size in the sample is 3.18 students. 
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Class Size -0.0017 -0.87 -0.0125 -1.13
CS*MoveC -0.0017 -0.27 -0.0003 -0.01
CS*MoveD -0.0008 -0.1 -0.1277 -3.27 ***
CS*MoveR 0.0091 -0.69 -0.0456 -0.87
MoveC -0.0155 -0.54 -0.0215 -0.15
MoveD -0.0601 -1.72 * 0.502 -2.9 ***
MoveR -0.0776 -1.32 0.1618 -0.7
Prev Score 0.4017 -237.1 *** 0.4019 -236.69 ***
Female -0.0148 -5.8 *** -0.0149 -5.82 ***
Asian 0.1514 -14.37 *** 0.1521 -14.41 ***
Black -0.0733 -15.9 *** -0.0705 -14.85 ***
Hispanic -0.0132 -3.88 *** -0.0121 -3.52 ***
Free Lunch -0.0514 -16.11 *** -0.0533 -15.96 ***
GT 0.2551 -34.22 *** 0.2559 -34.19 ***
Sp Ed -0.1276 -7.58 *** -0.1261 -7.48 ***
ESL 0.083 -8.52 *** 0.0842 -8.61 ***
Bilingual -0.0217 -2.72 *** -0.0203 -2.51 ***
Avg Score 0.3323 -90.27 *** 0.3325 -89.25 ***
Var Score 0.1456 -65.16 *** 0.1447 -63.87 ***
Charter -0.0208 -1.07 -0.0068 -0.34
Acc Rating -0.0073 -4.6 *** -0.0073 -4.61 ***
Constant 0.1514 -16.6 *** 0.1991 -4.07 ***
R-squared 0.4947 0.4932
Cragg-Donald 1066.57
N=131,371
Table III.6
Effect of class size on math score (effects by moving types)
OLS 2SLS
Note: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses.  All non-binary 
variables are measured in standard deviations from the mean.
 
 
 
Note again that, in most cases, the 2SLS estimates are larger in magnitude 
than the simple OLS estimates, suggesting that OLS is biased upward.  Both the OLS 
and the 2SLS regressions suggest that the class size effect for non-movers is not 
significantly different from zero, but that at least one type of movers benefit from 
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smaller classes.  The only significant effects are for district movers; a one standard 
deviation decrease in class size increases math score by 0.128 standard deviations 
for students who move across districts but remain in the same region.  These 
results suggest the presence of heterogeneity in the effects between movers and 
non-movers, but also among movers of different types.  
 
III.6.3  Move Effect: OLS and 2SLS 
In addition to the class size effect, I also examine the effect of moving on test 
score.  I include dummy variables for each type of move in these regressions to 
allow a different intercept for each type.  The district moving dummy is the only 
one that significantly affects score.  The total move effect, when evaluated at the 
average level of class size, is -0.036, suggesting that district movers have scores that 
are 0.036 standard deviations below average.  Effects for the other two mover types 
are similar, although they are not precisely estimated and are not significantly 
different from zero.  These results, which suggest that students incur a substantial 
cost from moving, are consistent with much of the current literature.12  However, 
this relationship may be confounded by the fact that movers are systematically 
different from nonmovers, as seen in Table III.2.  A class size model that 
incorporates the moving decision will not only provide a clearer picture of the class 
size effect; it will also allow further exploration into the consequences of the 
moving choice. 
                                                 
12
 See Kain and O’Brien (1998).  
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III.6.4  Type-Specific Mover Model  
 Because students are able to choose which schools they attend through their 
choice of neighborhood, it is important to model the moving decision along with the 
class size effect.  I allow there to be three types of movers—students who move 
schools within their district (type 1), students who move schools across districts 
but remain in the same region (type 2), and students who move schools across 
regions (type 3).  While I hypothesize that type 1 and type 2 students are likely to 
be endogenous, while type 3 students are likely to be exogenous, I allow for the 
possibility that all types are endogenous.   
 I use maximum likelihood estimation to model both the class size effect and 
the moving decision as described in section III.4.1.  The results from the regression 
are reported in Tables III.7 and III.8 (note that these tables include results from a 
single estimation, rather than two separate estimations).  I first use the predicted 
class size instrument to obtain  from the first stage regression.  I then use  as 
the key explanatory variable of interest in the MLE estimation.   
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Table III.7 
Effect of class size on math score  
(MLE with move dummies) 
Class Size -0.0151 (1.029) 
 CS*MoveC -0.0138 (0.382) 
 CS*MoveD -0.1029 (2.867) *** 
CS*MoveR -0.0397 (0.684) 
 MoveC 0.1480 (0.930) 
 MoveD 0.3498 (2.149) ** 
MoveR 0.1433 (0.558) 
 Sigma 0.4630 (454.252) *** 
Lambda 1 -0.3927 (8.071) *** 
Lambda 2 0.1708 (2.317) ** 
Lambda 3 2.0249 (0.323) 
 Previous Score 0.4021 (225.237) *** 
Female -0.0149 (5.667) *** 
Asian 0.1528 (14.216) *** 
Black -0.0737 (14.486) *** 
Hispanic -0.0147 (4.110) *** 
Free Lunch -0.0554 (14.996) *** 
Gifted/Talented 0.2568 (33.052) *** 
Special Ed -0.1276 (7.366) *** 
ESL 0.0837 (8.390) *** 
Bilingual -0.0220 (2.667) *** 
Average Score 0.3331 (84.656) *** 
Variance Score 0.1461 (63.147) *** 
Charter -0.0307 (1.566) 
 Acc Rating -0.0076 (4.572) *** 
Constant 0.2070 (3.190) *** 
N=131,371 
Note: This regression also contains neighborhood 
characteristics, shown in Table III.8.  Absolute values of t-
statistics are in parentheses.  All non-binary variables are 
measured in standard deviations from the mean. 
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Table III.8 
Moving decision with neighborhood characteristics (from MLE)   
  Campus Movers District Movers Region Movers 
Student Characteristics 
         Previous Score -0.0374 (3.436) *** -0.1125 (8.898) *** 2.4743 (0.705) 
 Female 0.0135 (0.873) 
 
0.0096 (0.487) 
 
-0.5705 (0.869) 
 Asian -0.2336 (3.243) *** -0.2466 (2.895) *** -25.4315 (0.636) 
 Black 0.3215 (8.059) *** 0.3159 (9.455) *** 8.3019 (0.676) 
 Hispanic 0.1627 (5.646) *** 0.0150 (0.563) 
 
5.9089 (0.622) 
 Free Lunch 0.1969 (9.340) *** 0.0499 (2.549) *** -2.4853 (0.654) 
 GT -0.2904 (5.792) *** -0.6743 (9.191) *** -4.0099 (0.409) 
 Special Education 0.0067 (0.066) 
 
-0.6115 (4.148) *** -11.0801 (0.648) 
 ESL -0.1787 (3.124) *** -0.4554 (6.320) *** -9.8134 (0.572) 
 Bilingual -0.0442 (0.844) 
 
-0.4543 (6.017) *** -6.2099 (0.747) 
 School Characteristics: Current 
         Average House Value 0.1509 (4.752) *** -0.1338 (6.195) *** -1.9376 (0.613) 
 Income Per Household 0.2400 (6.271) *** 0.4597 (15.188) *** -7.5867 (0.665) 
 Median Age -0.0330 (0.671) 
 
0.1709 (4.183) *** 5.3571 (0.672) 
 Percent Black (Zip) 1.1191 (11.641) *** -0.5038 (2.217) ** -32.6034 (0.621) 
 Percent Hispanic (Zip) 0.5538 (0.791) 
 
-0.0529 (0.405) 
 
18.3096 (0.778) 
 Percent Asian (Zip) -0.4788 (0.325) 
 
-2.5051 (6.022) *** 74.7939 (0.652) 
 Percent Other (Zip) 1.8751 (1.023) 
 
-0.4275 (2.387) ** -69.7933 (0.680) 
 Average Score 0.0371 (1.393) 
 
-0.1279 (4.799) *** -0.7013 (1.063) 
 Variance Score -0.0126 (0.868) 
 
-0.0744 (4.876) *** -0.3447 (0.348) 
 Accountability Rating 0.0043 (0.430) 
 
0.0097 (0.921) 
 
-0.6927 (0.509) 
 Class Size 0.1363 (2.876) *** 0.0029 (0.034) 
 
4.1436 (0.687) 
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Table III.8 (Continued) 
 
Campus Movers District Movers Region Movers 
School Characteristics: Previous 
        Average House Value -0.1854 (5.921) *** 0.1392 (7.008) *** -2.9800 (0.630) 
 Income Per Household -0.1386 (3.207) *** -0.5607 (19.917) *** 4.9065 (0.624) 
 Median Age -0.5067 (11.100) *** -0.4309 (10.525) *** -9.6879 (0.644) 
 Percent Black (Zip) -1.1290 (9.002) *** 0.1511 (0.848) 
 
3.3603 (0.383) 
 Percent Hispanic (Zip) -0.7650 (1.236) 
 
-0.6656 (3.450) *** -27.7386 (0.701) 
 Percent Asian (Zip) -0.4512 (0.290) 
 
2.6119 (8.577) *** -30.6996 (0.507) 
 Percent Other (Zip) -2.3662 (1.499) 
 
0.5550 (1.216) 
 
68.5499 (0.627) 
 Average Score -0.0348 (1.791) * -0.1396 (5.641) *** 0.0472 (0.028) 
 Variance Score 0.0185 (1.346) 
 
-0.0155 (1.065) 
 
-1.4400 (0.966) 
 Accountability Rating -0.1183 (11.950) *** -0.0197 (1.936) 
 
1.4152 (0.765) 
 Class Size 0.0222 (2.979) *** -0.0349 (4.897) *** 1.4287 (0.653)   
N=131,371                   
Note: These results are from the MLE estimation reported in Table III.7.  Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses.  All non-binary variables 
are measured in standard deviations. 
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III.6.4.1  Class Size Effect in the Type-Specific Model 
Table III.7 shows the heterogeneity in the effect of smaller classes that exists 
across different types of movers.  Like the 2SLS results, the MLE suggests that the 
only students for whom smaller classes are effective are district movers.  A one 
standard deviation decrease in class size increases expected score by 0.103 
standard deviations. 13 While the effects for nonmovers, campus movers, and 
district movers are all statistically insignificant, it is useful to examine the point 
estimates.  They are all negative and fairly small, suggesting a negative overall 
effect and slight additional effects for the other two mover types.   However, even if 
these effects were significant, they would still be dwarfed by the much larger effect 
of the district movers. 
This large class size effect for district movers is robust to specification; it is 
present in both the 2SLS and the MLE.  A natural question is why this should be 
true.  What is different about district movers that makes them any more sensitive 
to smaller classes than other types of students?  One possible explanation lies in the 
composition of these students.  Other research suggests that students along 
different points of the score distribution respond differently to school inputs, such 
as class size.  Previous work shows that students at the lowest end of the 
distribution gain the most from a decrease in class size.  If district movers are 
composed more heavily of students from the lower end of the distribution, then a 
greater response to class size should be expected.   
                                                 
13 Note that all variables (excluding dummy variables) are measured in deviations from the mean. 
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 To examine this type of distribution, I divide students into ten deciles of 
equal size based on their previous year score.  Figure III.3 shows the percent of 
each group (nonmovers, campus movers, district movers, and region movers) 
composed of students from the bottom three deciles.  This graph suggests that 
district movers include a disproportionate amount of these bottom decile students.  
For example, while 10.6 percent of the total population is in the first decile, 16.7 
percent of district movers are in this group.  (Only 11.9 percent of region movers 
and 14.2 percent of campus movers are in the first decile.)   
 
 
 
Figure III.3.  Percent of students in bottom deciles. 
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Table III.9  
Effect of class size on math score with decile groups (2SLS) 
  Without Groups With Groups 
Class Size -0.0125 -1.13 
 
0.1159 (5.54) *** 
CS*MoveC -0.0003 -0.01 
 
0.0004 (0.01) 
 CS*MoveD -0.1277 -3.27 *** -0.0878 (2.35) ** 
CS*MoveR -0.0456 -0.87 
 
-0.0442 (0.85) 
 CS*Group1 
   
-0.1838 (10.77) *** 
CS*Group2 
   
-0.1605 (9.29) *** 
CS*Group3 
   
-0.1414 (8.12) *** 
CS*Group4 
   
-0.1267 (7.22) *** 
CS*Group5 
   
-0.1148 (6.51) *** 
CS*Group6 
   
-0.1040 (5.84) *** 
CS*Group7 
   
-0.0943 (5.26) *** 
CS*Group8 
   
-0.0976 (5.37) *** 
CS*Group9 
   
-0.0871 (4.75) *** 
CS*Group10 
   
-0.1081 (5.70) *** 
MoveC -0.0215 (0.15) 
 
-0.0206 (0.15) 
 MoveD 0.5020 (2.90) *** 0.3297 (1.99) ** 
MoveR 0.1618 (0.70) 
 
0.1581 (0.69) 
 Prev Score 0.4019 (236.69) *** 0.3197 (37.28) *** 
Female -0.0149 (5.82) *** -0.0044 (1.79) * 
Asian 0.1521 (14.41) *** 0.1487 (14.60) *** 
Black -0.0705 (14.85) *** -0.0436 (9.47) *** 
Hispanic -0.0121 (3.52) *** 0.0014 (0.41) 
 Free Lunch -0.0533 (15.96) *** -0.0451 (13.94) *** 
GT 0.2559 (34.19) *** 0.2560 (35.32) *** 
Sp Ed -0.1261 (7.48) *** -0.1087 (6.67) *** 
ESL 0.0842 (8.61) *** -0.0172 (1.74) * 
Bilingual -0.0203 (2.51) *** -0.0204 (2.56) *** 
Avg Score 0.3325 (89.25) *** 0.3097 (85.67) *** 
Var Score 0.1447 (63.87) *** 0.1359 (61.96) *** 
Charter -0.0068 (0.34) 
 
-0.0133 (0.69) 
 Acc Rating -0.0073 (4.61) *** -0.0100 (6.50) *** 
R-squared 0.4932 
  
0.5322 
  Cragg-Donald 1066.57 
  
300.033 
  N=131,371             
Note:  Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses.  All non-binary 
variables are measured in standard deviations from the mean. 
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Table III.9 presents the 2SLS result from Table III.6, compared to the same 
regression with interaction effects between class size and the decile groups.  An 
examination of the group coefficients confirms that students in the lowest deciles 
do gain the most from smaller classes.  In addition, the class size coefficient for 
district movers has decreased in magnitude from -0.1277 to -0.0878, a reduction of 
almost one third.  This suggests that a substantial portion of the class size effect for 
district movers can be accounted for by the composition effect, although there is 
clearly still a separate district effect.  
 
III.6.4.2  Moving Effect in the Type-Specific Model 
The chief advantage of the type-specific model I propose is that it allows the 
moving decision to be estimated simultaneously with the class size effect while 
accounting for different types of moves.  I categorize students into endogenous and 
exogenous movers based on the types of transfers they make (campus moves, 
district moves, or region moves).  Recall that the original hypothesis is that type 1 
and type 2 movers should be endogenous, while type 3 movers should be 
exogenous.   While I make this assumption, I allow for the possibility that all types 
are endogenous.   
Table III.7 reports estimates for 𝜆1, 𝜆2 , and 𝜆3, which show how the errors of 
the score equation and the moving equation are correlated.  I find that estimate for 
𝜆1 is significant and negative, indicating endogeneity for type 1 movers.  This 
estimate suggests that students who are likely to mover campuses perform poorer 
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than expected on the standardized math test.  The estimate for 𝜆2 is significant and 
positive, suggesting that students who are likely to be district movers perform 
better than expected on the standardized test.  This is consistent with the findings 
in Hanushek et al. (2004), which suggest that district movers are Tiebout movers.  I 
find that 𝜆3 is not significantly different from zero, which suggests that type 3 
movers are likely to be exogenous.  This makes sense intuitively; families who move 
regions across the state of Texas are more likely to be motivated by some outside 
factor like a change in job or family structure, rather than because of schooling. 
 
 
Class Size -0.0125 (1.13) -0.0151 (1.03)
CS*MoveC -0.0003 (0.01) -0.0138 (0.38)
CS*MoveD -0.1277 (3.27) *** -0.1029 (2.87) *** 
CS*MoveR -0.0456 (0.87) -0.0397 (0.68)
MoveC -0.0215 (0.15) 0.148 (0.93)
MoveD 0.502 (2.90) *** 0.3498 (2.15) ** 
MoveR 0.1618 (0.70) 0.1433 (0.56)
MoveC -0.0228 0.0867
MoveD -0.0650 -0.1071
Comparison of the Move Effect
Overall Move Effect Evaluated at Average Class Size
Table III.10
2SLS MLE
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The endogeneity of campus and district movers causes the estimates of the 
moving effect to be biased in the previous OLS and 2SLS regressions.  Table III.10 
compares the overall moving effect as estimated in the 2SLS and the MLE models 
and shows substantial bias in the 2SLS results.  Consider first the district movers.  
Using the 2SLS estimates, the overall moving effect when evaluated at the average 
value of class size14 is -0.065.  Hanushek et al. (2004) find a similar negative effect 
of district move on current year score.15  However, simply controlling for students 
who move may yield a biased result.  The results from the MLE suggest that district 
movers are endogenous; students who are more likely to be district movers 
perform better than expected on the math exam.  Because of this endogeneity, the 
moving coefficient of -0.065 is overestimated compared to the MLE, which is -
0.1071.   
The opposite result occurs for the campus movers, although the overall 
effects in both the OLS/2SLS and MLE are not significantly different from zero.  
Campus movers are endogenous and negative; students who are more likely to be 
campus movers perform worse than expected on the math exam.  This endogeneity 
causes the overall moving effect in the 2SLS (-0.0228) to be underestimated 
relative to the MLE (0.0867), although both estimates are statistically insignificant. 
There is not a large difference in the results for the regional movers, whose 
moving decisions seem to be exogenous.  Both estimates are insignificant, but 
                                                 
14
 Class size here is measured in standard deviations.  The average value is 4.44. 
15
 Hanushek et al. (2004) find that district movers have scores that are 0.095 standard deviations 
lower than nonmovers. 
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similar in magnitude.  The 2SLS point estimate of moving is -0.0407, compared with 
an estimate of -0.033 in the MLE. 
 
III.6.4.3  Student and Neighborhood Characteristics in the Moving Decision 
Table III.8 includes the student and neighborhood characteristics from the 
moving decision, which I model simultaneously with the class size effect.  (Table 
III.7 and Table III.8 report results from the same estimation.)  A different moving 
equation is estimated for each of the three moving types.  In addition to student 
characteristics, the explanatory variables include the neighborhood characteristics 
described in section III.5.4 for both the current campus and the previous campus, as 
well as school characteristics (average score, accountability rating, and class size) 
from both campuses.    Column 1 reports results for campus movers.  Students who 
switch schools within their own districts are more likely to be low scoring, low 
income minority students.  District movers are similar; they are likely to be black, 
to qualify for free lunch, and to have low previous scores.   None of the 
characteristics are strong predictors for region movers, which provides further 
evidence that those students are exogenous movers.   
 
III.7  Conclusions and Future Work 
 Although movers constitute a large proportion of the student population and 
although the class size effect is heterogeneous in its impact on movers and 
nonmovers, previous class size studies have not carefully modeled the moving 
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decision simultaneously with the class size effect.  As a result, simple OLS models 
may result in biased estimates of the moving effect.  In this study, I propose a two-
type model that estimates students’ moving decisions as well as the class size effect.  
I assume that students may be exogenous or endogenous movers and allow the 
class size effect to vary across movers of different types.   
Using student-level test score and moving data from Texas, I identify three 
groups of movers—campus movers, district movers, and region movers.  I find that 
while the class size effect is small and insignificant on average, it is particularly 
important for district movers who switch to schools in another district but remain 
in the same region.  At least part of this explanation lies in the fact that district 
movers are composed more heavily of lower scoring students, who tend to respond 
more to smaller classes.  The maximum likelihood model which estimates the 
moving decision reveals that campus and district movers are likely to be 
endogenous, while students who move across regions are exogenous movers.  Most 
important, the model reveals that the endogeneity of the moving decision causes 
OLS models that simply control for moving to be biased.  The results suggest that 
the move effect for campus movers is typically underestimated in the OLS, while 
the effect is overestimated for district movers.    
 Creating a careful model of the moving decision is necessary not only in 
understanding school input effects, such as class size, but also in understanding the 
effect of moving itself on students’ academic performance.  This paper provides a 
first step in creating a model that incorporates both class size and the moving 
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decision.  Future work will model the endogeneity of movers in a more flexible way 
by allowing type of move (campus, district, or region) to serve as one of several 
identifying factors to determine the probability of endogeneity. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DOES SORTING STUDENTS IMPROVE SCORES?  
AN ANALYSIS OF CLASS SIZE AND CLASS COMPOSITION 
 
IV.1  Introduction 
 
 While several studies have found that smaller classes are an effective tool 
for improving student achievement16 and many states have implemented class size 
reduction legislation, a related but lesser-studied issue is how students are actually 
divided into classes.  Schools may use several different strategies to allocate 
students among different classrooms.  Some schools may choose to sort students by 
ability level and create classes of relatively homogeneous students.  Alternatively, 
schools may choose to sort students with varying abilities evenly across classes.  
Other schools may try to match students and teachers, while taking into account 
individual students’ learning styles.  In some situations, variables such as parents’ 
preferences or students’ behavior records may play a part in the class composition 
process.   
Many of these allocation strategies will more effective when schools have 
more classes into which they can divide students.  This is directly related to 
schools’ class size policies.  Holding enrollment constant, schools that choose to 
offer smaller classes must also offer more classes.  This may increase the 
                                                 
16
 See Hanushek (1997), Krueger (2003), and Mishel and Rothstein (2002) for a general analysis of 
the class size literature. 
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effectiveness of schools’ sorting strategies, if they choose to track students into 
groups based on ability or previous testing scores.  Therefore, what some studies 
have classified as a class size effect may be confounded by schools’ abilities to sort 
students into classes. 
The purpose of this study is twofold.  First, I examine the class size effect 
across different types of schools—some that appear to sort students into more 
homogeneous groups, and some who do not.  Using a unique dataset from Dallas 
Independent School District that allows a student to be tracked not only to his 
school and grade, but also to his actual classroom, I can precisely measure both 
actual class size and the student dispersion within a class.  I attempt to disentangle 
the class size effect from the sorting effect by constructing several sorting indices 
which measure the dispersion of students based on observable characteristics, such 
as previous score and Gifted and Talented (G/T) classification.  Second, I explore 
the basic impact of sorting on student performance.  I create a model that analyzes 
the effect of sorting for several different types of students in order to determine if 
sorting is beneficial, and, if so, for whom.  Using a different grade’s sorting index as 
an instrument for the sorting index within a given school-grade, I find that a higher 
degree of sorting significantly improves scores for all types of students. 
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IV.2  Empirical Model 
 
IV.2.1  Class Size and Sorting 
 
 With equal enrollments, a school that divides its students into smaller 
classes necessarily has more classes than a school that has larger classes.  Because 
schools that sort students into different group may be able to sort more efficiently 
with smaller classes, it is possible that what is typically identified as a class size 
effect is actually a sorting effect.  Consider the following equation: 
𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 −1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 𝛽 + 𝜂𝑐𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 , (IV.1) 
where 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡  represents the test score of student i in class j in time t, 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 −1 represents 
the same student’s previous year score, 𝑐𝑠𝑗𝑡  represents the number of students in 
class j, and 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡  is a vector of student-level controls.  In this equation, the degree of 
sorting within class j is unobserved.  An endogeneity problem arises if sorting and 
class size are correlated and sorting affects student performance.  If an increased 
level of sorting, or the creation of more homogeneous classes, improves students’ 
test scores, and if class size and sorting are positively correlated, then the class size 
coefficient in equation (IV.1) will be biased downward.  Alternatively, if more 
heterogeneous classes benefit students, then the class size coefficient will be biased 
upward.    
 To control for the degree of sorting in a specific class, I consider the 
following equation: 
𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 −1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 𝛽 + 𝜂𝑐𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝜙𝛾𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 , (IV.2) 
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where 𝛾𝑗𝑡  is a sorting index for a class j, describing the dispersion of the students in 
the classroom based on observable characteristics, such as score.  In addition to 
disentangling the effect of class size and sorting, I am also interested in the sorting 
effect on its own.  In order to examine how sorting may affect different types of 
students, I allow 𝜙 to vary by students’ observable characteristics.  I used several 
different sorting indices in the analysis, each of which is described in the following 
section. 
 
IV.2.2  A Sorting Index 
 
A school’s decision to sort students, or to track them into different groups, 
may have different implications for different groups of students.  For example, 
sorting high-scoring students into one class and low-scoring students into another 
class may allow the classes to move at different paces, which may benefit both 
groups of students.  The teacher in the low-scoring class may be able to focus on 
foundational skills necessary to the improvement the students, while the teacher in 
the high-scoring class may have the opportunity to move on to new, more 
challenging material without the fear of losing the understanding of the class.   
However, this type of sorting may not necessarily benefit both groups.  An 
alternative hypothesis is that by creating evenly distributed groups, students with 
more understanding of the material may be able to help those with less 
understanding.  In this situation, low-scoring students might benefit without 
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causing a cost for high-scoring students.  (It may even be plausible that this 
situation could benefit both high scorers and low scorers.) 
 The same possibilities hold for sorting based on G/T classification.  Some 
schools may group all G/T students into a single class to allow them to move at 
their own pace, while other schools may divide them into several classes with other 
non-G/T students.17  Having G/T students included in a regular classroom could 
potentially help or hurt non-G/T students in the same ways that high-scoring 
students could affect low-scoring students. 
 To empirically determine the effects of both types of sorting, I first construct 
a measure defining how “sorted” a class is.  I define the following index for each 
class: 
𝛾𝑗 =  
𝜎𝑗−𝜎𝑘
𝜎𝑘
 , (IV.3) 
where 𝜎𝑗  is the standard deviation of the scores within class j, and 𝜎𝑘  is the 
standard deviation of the scores within school k, of which class j is a member.  In 
the extreme case in which a class is completely sorted, every student in the class 
has the same prior year score, so 𝜎𝑗  is equal to zero.  The parameter 𝜎𝑘  is a measure 
of the variation in the school as a whole.  As  𝜎𝑗  approaches zero, 𝛾𝑗  approaches 1.   
In the opposite case, in which students are not sorted at all, there should be 
no difference in the dispersion of scores within class j and the dispersion of scores 
                                                 
17
 Even if G/T students are divided into classrooms with many non-G/T students, they still may be 
“pulled out” for several hours during the school day or during the week.  Unfortunately, the Dallas 
ISD data contains only one classroom per student, so it is not possible to tell if the students 
participate in this type of program.  
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within school k.  In this situation, 𝜎𝑗  is equal to 𝜎𝑘  and 𝛾𝑗  is equal to zero.  Therefore, 
𝛾𝑗 𝜖[0, 1] measures the dispersion of scores within a given class while controlling for 
overall potential dispersion at the school level.   
I define a similar measure to gauge the measure of G/T sorting within a 
class.  I construct the following index: 
𝛾𝑗
𝐺𝑇 =  
𝜎𝑗
𝐺𝑇 − 𝜎𝑘
𝐺𝑇
𝜎𝑘
𝐺𝑇  , (IV.4) 
where 𝜎𝑗
𝐺𝑇  is the standard deviation within class j of the binary variable indicating 
G/T status, and 𝜎𝑘
𝐺𝑇  is the standard deviation of the same variable within school k.  
In the extreme case in which all the G/T students are placed into the same class, 
𝜎𝑗
𝐺𝑇  is equal to zero, and 𝛾𝑗
𝐺𝑇  becomes 1.   
 Alternatively, if G/T students are divided evenly among all classes, then the 
standard deviation of the G/T variable in each class will be equivalent to the 
standard deviation of the G/T variable in the school.  In this case,  𝛾𝑗
𝐺𝑇  becomes 
zero.  Therefore, 𝛾𝑗
𝐺𝑇𝜖[0, 1], where a higher number indicates more sorting. 
 
IV.2.3  Endogeneity of the Sorting Index 
 
 It is essential to consider not only the effect of sorting on students’ scores 
but also why they are sorted into their given classes at the outset.  Although the 
dataset allows identification of characteristics such as previous score and G/T 
status, teachers and principals observe many other variables which may be used to 
divide students into different classrooms.  Principals may attempt to “match” 
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certain students with certain teachers, or they may have policies whereby parents 
can request a certain teacher for their children.   
Unobserved variables like behavior may also play an important role in the 
classroom assignment process.  For example, if a principal observes that several 
students have had behavior problems in the past, he may try to divide those 
students evenly across the classes within a grade, or he may assign them to a 
particular teacher who has had success with behavioral problems in the past.  In 
this case, behavior is an unobserved variable that affects a school’s sorting index.  
However, a student’s behavior may also affect his test score, causing an 
endogeneity problem.   
In order to deal with this endogeneity, I create an instrument for the sorting 
index using other another grade’s sorting index.  If the administration at school k 
uses certain guidelines in assigning students to classes in grade g, it is likely that 
those guidelines are also used for other grades in school k.  Therefore, the sorting 
indices for classes in grade g should be correlated with the sorting indices for grade 
g-1.  However, there is no reason to believe that the way in which classes are sorted 
in grade g-1 should impact the scores of students in grade g.  Therefore, sorting 
indices in grade g-1 should provide valid instruments for sorting indices in grade g. 
The problem that arises when trying to match indices from individual 
classes across grades is that there is no way to map the classes from third grade to 
specific fourth grade classes.  Instead, I create a grade-specific sorting measure that 
can be used for all classes within a grade.  I define the following two parameters: 
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𝛼1𝑘 =  
1
𝑁
  𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑘 − 𝑠𝑘  
2
 (IV.5) 
and 
𝛼2𝑘 =  
1
𝐽
 
1
𝑁𝑗
  𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑘 − 𝑠𝑗  
2
 (IV.6) 
where 𝑠𝑘  is the score average in school k,  𝑠𝑗  is the score average in school j, 𝑁𝑗  
represents the total number of students in class j, N represents the total number of 
students in school k, and J represents the total number of classes in school k.  The 
parameter 𝛼1𝑘  is a measure of score dispersion in school k, while the parameter 𝛼2𝑘  
is a measure of score dispersion in classes j=1,…,J of school k.  I define the following 
variable as the sorting index for school k: 
𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑘 =
𝛼1𝑘
𝛼2𝑘
. (IV.7) 
Higher values of 𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑘  indicate less dispersion of scores within classes relative to 
score dispersion with the school, which means more sorting.  Lower values of 𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑘  
indicate more dispersion of scores within classes, which means less sorting.  In the 
empirical estimation, I use 𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑘  for the third grade to instrument for 𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑘  for the 
fourth grade. 
  
IV.3  TAKS Data from Dallas ISD 
 
 One drawback to many datasets used to explore the class size effect is that 
students cannot typically be linked to their actual classes.  For example, the Texas 
Education Agency (TEA) collects student-level testing data from the Texas 
Assessment of Knowledge and Skills (TAKS) for all public school students starting 
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in third grade.  However, while students’ schools and grade levels are available in 
the dataset, their specific classes are not.  Therefore, any measure of class size must 
be an average across all grades within a given school.  While class size effects may 
be identified from across-school variation, the structure of the data leaves little 
room to explore within-school class composition effects. 
 While students are not linked to specific classes in the statewide dataset, 
several school districts do collect student-level data that may be linked to a class 
variable.  I employ a unique dataset from Dallas Independent School District that 
contains both class and grade identifying information.  The dataset includes 
student-level math TAKS scores for two school years.  I examine all third grade 
students in the 2003-2004 school year who become fourth graders in 2004-2005, a 
total of 9,325 children from 138 different schools in Dallas ISD.  In addition to 
achievement scores for both years, the dataset contains race and gender variables 
and identifiers for students qualifying for programs such as free or reduced lunch, 
Gifted and Talented, Special Education, and Limited English Proficiency.  Because 
the data is available at the class level, I construct actual class size instead of using 
grade-level averages.  Summary statistics are shown in Table IV.1.   
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Table IV.1 
Summary statistics for Dallas ISD       
  Obs Mean St Dev Min Max 
Scale Score 9325 2191.02 192.84 1280 2684 
Previous Score 9325 2217.07 177.61 1708 2697 
Class Size 9325 19.45 3.08 3 27 
Black 9325 0.2894 0.4535 0 1 
Hispanic 9325 0.6446 0.4787 0 1 
Asian 9325 0.0119 0.1085 0 1 
Gifted/Talented 9325 0.2479 0.4318 0 1 
Free Lunch 9325 0.8571 0.3500 0 1 
Special Ed 9325 0.0432 0.2034 0 1 
Enrollment 9325 105.28 37.55 9 181 
Number of Classes 9325 5.38 1.87 1 12 
Gamma (Score) 9322 0.1437 0.1187 0 0.7579 
Gamma (G/T) 9264 0.1879 0.2256 0 1 
 
  
 
Texas reports students’ scores in two ways.  The first score is a student’s 
raw score, which corresponds to the number of questions he answered correctly on 
the exam.  For the 2004-2005 exam, the maximum raw score is 42 points.  The 
second score measure is a student’s scale score, which is scaled using the Rasch 
partial credit method to control for the difficulty of the exam across different 
administrations of the test.  Scale scores are used to compare two different cohorts’ 
scores.  For example, scale scores could be used to compare fourth graders in 2004 
with the following group of fourth graders, who took the exam in 2005.   
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Although the scores allow for direct comparison in this way, they are not 
meant to be vertically linked.  That is, a third grader’s 2004 score should not be 
directly compared to his fourth grade 2005 score in order to gauge improvement.  
Because that is precisely the comparison I want to make, I convert the scale scores 
into z scores, by subtracting out the mean score and dividing by the standard 
deviation in a given year.  A student’s z score is given by 
𝑠𝑖𝑡 =
𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 − 𝜇𝑡
ςt
, (IV.8) 
where 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡  is student i’s scale score in period t, and 𝜇𝑡  and ςt  represent the mean 
and standard deviation of the scale scores.  A student’s score is now a 
representation of where he lies along the distribution of scores.  I generate z scores 
for both the current year (2004-2005) and the previous year (2003-2004). 
  
IV.4  Empirical Results 
 
IV.4.1  Score Sorting 
 
 Before examining any effects of sorting or class size, it is first important to 
determine whether any schools appear to sort students based on observable 
characteristics and how prevalent this type of sorting is.  I explore potential sorting 
based on two observable characteristics: previous TAKS math score and a student’s 
Gifted/Talented status.  To investigate sorting based on students’ previous scores, I 
create dummy variables for each class and compare the mean scores by running the 
following regression: 
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𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 −1 = 𝛽1 +  𝛽𝑗
𝐽
𝑗 =2
𝐷𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 , 
(IV.9) 
where 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 −1  is student i’s test score in the previous year and 𝐷𝑗  is a dummy variable 
for class j.  Therefore, 𝛽1 gives the mean score for the first class and 𝛽2, 𝛽3, … , 𝛽𝐽  
show the differences in score relative to the first class.  If schools divide their 
students into classes randomly, then there should be no difference in the previous 
year score means for any of the classes.  That is, 𝛽2, 𝛽3, … , 𝛽𝐽  should not be 
significantly different from zero or from each other. 
Alternatively, if schools do divide students into classes based on their 
previous year scores, then there should be significant differences in the average 
scores.  Consider the case in which a school has three classes within a single grade.  
The administration may choose to sort students into three groups—low-scoring 
students who need additional math assistance to improve their grades, average-
scoring students who are achieving at grade-level, and high-scoring students who 
are ready to move on to more challenging material.  In this case, 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 would be 
significantly different from zero, as well as different from each other.   
I run regression (?) for each of the 138 schools in the district to determine 
which schools potentially sort by previous year score.  The results are reported in 
Tables B1.1-B1.14 of Appendix B.  Consider, for example, the results for school 186, 
which are given in Table B.1.7.  This school has four classes of fourth graders—two 
with lower average math scores and two with higher average math scores.  The 
average score for class 1, given by the constant, is 26.1 (the maximum raw score is 
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42 points).  The coefficient for class 2 is not significantly different from zero, and 
the point estimate is only 1.2 points, suggesting that there is no substantial score 
difference between the two classes.  However, the estimates for class 3 and 4 are 
both statistically significant and indicate a 4.9 point and 6.1 point difference in 
score from class 1.   At least one class dummy variable is significant in 44 of the 138 
schools (about 32 percent of schools).   
For the other 94 schools, there is no significant difference between the 
average previous scores.  School 109’s results, reported in Table B1.1, suggest that 
there is no statistical difference in the scores of the four classes.  The average score 
for class 1 is 28.8, and the score differences for the other classes range from .09 
points to 2.3 points.  None of these differences is statistically different from zero.  It 
is important to note that even if score averages are not significantly different, 
schools may still be considering score in a strategic division of students into classes.  
Some schools may be purposefully allocating students of different abilities equally 
among classes.  If administrators believe that an equal division of student ability is 
beneficial to some or all students, then there should be no significant score average 
score difference between classes, even if the school is acting strategically.   
 
IV.4.2  Gifted/Talented Sorting 
 
 In addition to sorting by previous test score, schools may also sort by other 
observable characteristics, such as whether a student qualifies for a Gifted and 
Talented (G/T) program.  Some schools may try to group all of their G/T students 
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together in a single class, while others may try to disperse them evenly among a 
number of classes.  In order to determine whether being in a certain class predicts 
the likelihood that a student qualifies as G/T, I run the following probit regression: 
𝐺𝑇𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽1 +  𝛽𝑗
𝐽
𝑗 =2
𝐷𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 , (IV.10) 
where 𝐺𝑇𝑖𝑗  is a dummy variable equal to one if a student qualifies for a G/T 
program.  The right hand side of this equation is analogous to equation (IV.9), 
where 𝐷𝑗  is a dummy variable for class j.   
Consider the example of a school with three classes.  In an extreme case, the 
school may create a single class for only G/T students, in which case, that class 
dummy would predict G/T status with certainty.  However, even if there are some 
G/T students in all classes, sorting may still exist if they are grouped allocated more 
heavily in some classes.  
It should be noted that schools may face constraints related to which 
teachers are certified to teach G/T students.  For example, if a principal’s strategy 
included dispersing G/T students equally among all the classes within a grade, he 
would be forced to deviate from that strategy if some of the fourth grade teachers 
were not certified.  Ideally, teacher characteristics would be included in the analysis 
to reveal potential sorting constraints.  However, because the data allows linkage to 
a specific class but not to a teacher, this is not possible. 
The results from this analysis are reported in Tables B2.1-B2.14 of Appendix 
B.  Each column shows the results from an individual school.  Almost all of the 
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schools (134 of 138) serve at least one G/T student.  (Of the four schools for which 
there is no variation in G/T status, three have no G/T students, and one is 
composed only of G/T students.)  As in the previous section, I find that many 
schools appear to sort based on G/T status and many schools do not.  School 108, 
for example, appears to sort G/T students into different classes.  The results for this 
school are reported in Table B2.1.  The school has three classes of fourth graders, 
one of which does not contain any G/T students.  Being enrolled in class 3 reduces 
the likelihood that a child is classified as a G/T student by a statistically significant 
32 percent, when compared to the base outcome (class 1), suggesting that this 
school groups its G/T students more heavily into class 1.   
Other schools appear to divide their G/T students more evenly across 
classes.  School 163 (results reported in Table B2.6) also has three classes of fourth 
graders, each of which contain G/T students.  None of the class dummy variables is 
significant for this school, indicating that no class assignment significantly 
increases the likelihood that a student is classified as G/T over the base outcome.  
Again, lack of significance in this situation does not necessarily mean that schools 
do not consider G/T status when assigning students to classes.  Schools may be 
purposefully dividing students evenly across classes.   
Of the 134 schools that serve G/T students, 40 have at least one class 
dummy that significantly changes the likelihood of a student’s G/T classification.  In 
addition, 19 schools have at least one class with no G/T students at all.  (These 
classes are dropped from the regressions because they perfectly predict failure of 
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the dependent variable.)  When including these schools, the percentage of schools 
sorting by G/T status is about 44 percent.  
Figure IV.1 shows a summary of the results from sections IV.4.1 and IV.4.2.  
Of the 138 schools, 44 (about 32 percent of all schools) sort by previous score and 
59 (about 43 percent of all schools) sort by G/T status.  There are 68 schools that 
do not sort using either characteristic (or choose to create evenly distributed 
classes) and 33 schools that sort using both G/T status and previous score.   
 
 
 
Figure IV.1  Summary of sorting status by sorting type, based on regressions from 
Appendices B1 and B2. 
 
 
 
IV.4.3  Class Size Effects and Sorting 
 Because of the potential relationship between class size and sorting, I 
estimate the class size effect separately for “sorting schools” and “non-sorting 
schools.”  I define two different types of sorting schools.  A school is a score sorting 
school if it is as such in section IV.5.1.  This requires that at least one of its classes 
No Yes 
No 68 schools 11 schools Total G/T Non-Sort: 79 schools 
Yes 26 schools 33 schools Total G/T Sort: 59 schools 
Total Sc Non-Sort: Total Sc Sort: 
94 schools 44 schools 
G/T  
Sorting     
Score Sorting 
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has a statistically different previous score average than another.  A school is a G/T 
sorting school if it is identified as such in section IV.5.2, which requires that at least 
one of its classes is a significant predictor of a student’s G/T status.   
 
Table IV.2 
Class size effect on math score (all schools) 
Class size -0.00543 
 
(-1.300) 
Previous score 0.583*** 
 
(68.62) 
Black -0.405*** 
 
(-11.09) 
Hispanic -0.221*** 
 
(-6.285) 
Asian 0.0391 
 
(0.521) 
G/T 0.463*** 
 
(24.57) 
Free lunch -0.0722*** 
 
(-3.213) 
Special Ed -0.206*** 
 
(-5.631) 
Enroll 0.00158** 
 
(2.133) 
Number Classes -0.0466*** 
  (-3.240) 
Obs 9325 
R-sq 0.494 
 
  
Table IV.2 shows the baseline results for all schools.  I estimate the effect of 
class size on math score, controlling for student and school characteristics.  As 
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explained in section IV.4, the dependent variable in these estimations is a z score 
constructed from students’ scale scores from the math TAKS test.  The class size 
coefficient is negative, but small and not statistically significant.  The point estimate 
indicates that a one student class size reduction increases predicted score by .005 
standard deviations.   
Table IV.3 divides the sample into schools that use G/T sorting and schools 
that do not.  I estimate the same regression for both samples and find different class 
size effects for each group.  While the class size effect for non-sorting schools is 
small and completely insignificant, the effect for schools that divide students based 
on G/T status is larger and magnitude and statistically significant.  For sorting 
schools, a one student class size reduction is associated with a predicted score 
increase of .013 standard deviations.   
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Table IV.3 
Class size effect on math score by sorting type (G/T) 
  
Non-Sorting 
Schools Sorting Schools 
Class size 0.00401 -0.0132** 
 
(0.623) (-2.416) 
Previous score 0.572*** 0.598*** 
 
(46.62) (50.73) 
Black -0.453*** -0.334*** 
 
(-8.874) (-6.234) 
Hispanic -0.236*** -0.183*** 
 
(-4.900) (-3.504) 
Asian 0.0712 0.0267 
 
(0.669) (0.251) 
G/T 0.454*** 0.471*** 
 
(17.15) (17.59) 
Free lunch -0.0985*** -0.0381 
 
(-2.938) (-1.262) 
Special Ed -0.205*** -0.202*** 
 
(-3.863) (-4.023) 
Enroll 0.000593 0.00210** 
 
(0.482) (2.281) 
Number Classes -0.0273 -0.0647*** 
  (-1.169) (-3.507) 
Obs 4843 4482 
R-sq 0.464 0.530 
 
 
  
  
9
4
 
Table IV.4 
Effect of class size on math score with sorting index 
  Full Sample Score Sorters Only G/T Sorters Only 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Gamma (Sc Sort) 
 
-0.255*** 
  
-0.389*** 
  
  
(-4.038) 
  
(-4.012) 
  Gamma (G/T Sort) 
  
-0.0358 
   
-0.108*** 
   
(-1.072) 
   
(-2.922) 
Class Size -0.00543 -0.00782* -0.00628 0.00738 0.00295 -0.0132** -0.0157*** 
 
(-1.300) (-1.846) (-1.480) (1.095) (0.430) (-2.416) (-2.850) 
Previous Score 0.583*** 0.582*** 0.584*** 0.607*** 0.608*** 0.598*** 0.597*** 
 
(68.62) (68.54) (68.51) (44.54) (44.66) (50.73) (50.64) 
Black -0.405*** -0.408*** -0.407*** -0.463*** -0.459*** -0.334*** -0.335*** 
 
(-11.09) (-11.20) (-10.99) (-8.184) (-8.139) (-6.234) (-6.258) 
Hispanic -0.221*** -0.225*** -0.224*** -0.298*** -0.297*** -0.183*** -0.178*** 
 
(-6.285) (-6.404) (-6.290) (-5.518) (-5.508) (-3.504) (-3.395) 
Asian 0.0391 0.0323 0.0263 0.154 0.148 0.0267 0.0281 
 
(0.521) (0.431) (0.349) (1.247) (1.202) (0.251) (0.265) 
G/T 0.463*** 0.462*** 0.459*** 0.453*** 0.455*** 0.471*** 0.461*** 
 
(24.57) (24.57) (24.18) (14.75) (14.86) (17.59) (17.12) 
Free Lunch -0.0722*** -0.0733*** -0.0731*** -0.0307 -0.0299 -0.0381 -0.0351 
 
(-3.213) (-3.263) (-3.233) (-0.902) (-0.879) (-1.262) (-1.165) 
Special Ed -0.206*** -0.206*** -0.207*** -0.272*** -0.267*** -0.202*** -0.202*** 
 
(-5.631) (-5.633) (-5.656) (-4.508) (-4.415) (-4.023) (-4.041) 
Enroll 0.00158** 0.00167** 0.00169** -0.00031 -9.75e-05 0.00210** 0.00236** 
 
(2.133) (2.245) (2.271) (-0.233) (-0.0727) (2.281) (2.556) 
  
  
9
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Table IV.4 (continued) 
Effect of class size on math score with sorting index 
  Full Sample Score Sorters Only G/T Sorters Only 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Number Classes -0.0466*** -0.0475*** -0.0484*** -0.0256 -0.0247 -0.0647*** -0.0691*** 
  (-3.240) (-3.287) (-3.341) (-1.047) (-1.003) (-3.507) (-3.736) 
Obs 9325 9322 9264 3546 3545 4482 4482 
R-sq 0.494 0.495 0.491 0.528 0.530 0.530 0.531 
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Such a striking difference in the class size effect based on whether or not a 
school sorts students by G/T classification indicates a relationship between the 
class size effect and schools’ sorting mechanisms.  Table IV.4 presents class size 
results with the sorting indices described in equations (IV.3) and (IV.4).  I include 
results for the full sample, only score sorters, and only G/T sorters.  Because sorting 
appears to have a negative effect on score, omitting the sorting index biases the 
class size effect upward, so that the true class size effect is actually more negative 
when the sorting index is included.18 
 
IV.4.4  Effect of Sorting on Score 
 
 It is not immediately clear whether sorting students will be beneficial for 
them or which types of sorting will be most beneficial for different types of 
students.  As described earlier, an intuitive argument can be made for the benefits 
of tracking students into homogenous classes, as well as for evenly dividing them 
into heterogeneous classes.  To explore this issue empirically, I create a sorting 
index for each class within a school measuring how dispersed its students are when 
compared to the overall school population at a single grade level.  Following the 
formulas described in equations (IV.3) and (IV.4), I construct two indices: 𝛾𝑗 , which 
measures sorting by previous math score, and 𝛾𝑗
𝐺𝑇 , which measures sorting by G/T 
status.  I include these variables in regressions for both types of sorting schools and 
                                                 
18
 It is important to note that the sorting index itself may be endogenous, which would change the 
results of the interaction between class size and class composition.  See section 4.5 for a discussion 
of the endogeneity of the sorting index.   
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measure their effects on all students, as well as on high and low scoring students 
and G/T and non-G/T students. 
 
 
 
Table IV.5 
Score sorting effect on math score 
  
Overall 
Effect 
Effect by Score 
Type 
Gamma  -0.389*** 
 
 
(-4.012) 
 Gamma*(High Scorers) 
 
-0.126 
  
(-1.011) 
Gamma*(Low Scorers) 
 
-0.626*** 
  
(-5.215) 
Class Size 0.00295 0.00390 
 
(0.430) (0.568) 
Previous Score 0.608*** 0.577*** 
 
(44.66) (35.37) 
Black -0.459*** -0.464*** 
 
(-8.139) (-8.232) 
Hispanic -0.297*** -0.298*** 
 
(-5.508) (-5.532) 
Asian 0.148 0.149 
 
(1.202) (1.207) 
G/T 0.455*** 0.447*** 
 
(14.86) (14.57) 
Free Lunch -0.0299 -0.0288 
 
(-0.879) (-0.848) 
Special Ed -0.267*** -0.263*** 
 
(-4.415) (-4.355) 
Enroll -9.75e-05 -0.000252 
 
(-0.0727) (-0.188) 
Number Classes -0.0247 -0.0227 
  (-1.003) (-0.924) 
Obs 3545 3545 
R-sq 0.530 0.531 
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Table IV.5 presents the results for the score sorting index.  The first column 
shows the overall sorting effect for all students in a score sorting school.  The 
overall effect is negative and significant, suggesting that students in classes with a 
higher degree of sorting score lower than those in classes with less sorting.  The 
point estimate shows that a 0.1 increase in the sorting index decreases predicted 
score by 0.038 standard deviations.  This might indicate that heterogeneous classes 
are more beneficial for students in terms of increasing test score, although the 
magnitude of the effect is fairly small. 
The second column divides the sorting effect between high scorers and low 
scorers.  The sample is divided roughly in half by previous year score; high scorers 
compose the top half of the distribution, and low scorers compose the bottom 
half.19  Interestingly, the negative overall effect of sorting is being driven the low 
scoring students.  The sorting coefficient for the low scorers is negative, significant, 
and about 1.6 times the magnitude of the overall coefficient.  The effect for high 
scoring students is negative but insignificant.  Intuitively, this suggests that a more 
even distribution of students within a class benefits students who typically perform 
poorly without hurting the scores of high performers.  
                                                 
19
 Low scorers have previous year scale scores between 1228 and 2198.  High scorers have previous 
year scale scores between 2224 and 2697.  
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Table IV.6 
G/T sorting effect on math score 
  Overall Effect Effect by G/T 
Gamma  -0.108*** 
 
 
(-2.922) 
 Gamma*(G/T) 
 
0.0195 
  
(0.172) 
Gamma*(Non-G/T) 
 
-0.122*** 
  
(-3.146) 
Class Size -0.0157*** -0.0155*** 
 
(-2.850) (-2.812) 
Previous Score 0.597*** 0.596*** 
 
(50.64) (50.53) 
Black -0.335*** -0.335*** 
 
(-6.258) (-6.258) 
Hispanic -0.178*** -0.177*** 
 
(-3.395) (-3.383) 
Asian 0.0281 0.0297 
 
(0.265) (0.280) 
G/T 0.461*** 0.432*** 
 
(17.12) (11.88) 
Free Lunch -0.0351 -0.0345 
 
(-1.165) (-1.144) 
Special Ed -0.202*** -0.203*** 
 
(-4.041) (-4.051) 
Enroll 0.00236** 0.00230** 
 
(2.556) (2.486) 
Number Classes -0.0691*** -0.0681*** 
  (-3.736) (-3.679) 
Obs 4482 4482 
R-sq 0.531 0.532 
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Table IV.6 presents the analogous results for the G/T sorting index.  I include 
the results for all students and then split the sample and examine the effect of 
sorting for G/T students and for non-G/T students.  Like the score sorting effect, the 
overall G/T sorting effect is negative and significant, revealing that a higher degree 
of sorting hurts students’ scores.  When I divide the effect between students of 
different G/T classifications, I find that this result is explained by the negative effect 
of sorting on non-G/T students.  While the sorting coefficient for non-G/T students 
is significant and negative, the coefficient for G/T students is actually positive, 
although it is insignificant.   
 
IV.4.5  Endogeneity of the Sorting Index 
 
 Schools choose how to divide students into classes, and it is likely that they 
make this determination using variables that are unobserved to the researcher.  As 
described in section IV.2.3, unobservable characteristics such as behavior may 
affect both schools’ sorting decisions and student performance.  To control for this, 
I create 𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑘  , a school-grade sorting index for each school and use the third grade 
index as an instrument for the fourth grade index.  The two indices should be 
correlated if schools’ sorting guidelines are similar across grades, but the third 
grade index should not directly impact the scores of fourth grade students. 
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Table IV.7 
Alpha score sorting effect on math score  
  OLS 2SLS 
Alpha Sort -0.255** 2.555** 
 
(-2.406) (2.300) 
Class Size 0.00786 -0.0104 
 
(1.165) (-1.003) 
Previous Score 0.623*** 0.614*** 
 
(44.98) (39.01) 
Black -0.374*** -0.418*** 
 
(-6.088) (-5.975) 
Hispanic -0.218*** -0.213*** 
 
(-3.643) (-3.216) 
Asian 0.214* 0.291** 
 
(1.739) (2.097) 
G/T 0.465*** 0.352*** 
 
(14.66) (6.227) 
Free Lunch -0.0689** -0.0174 
 
(-1.991) (-0.403) 
Special Ed -0.215*** -0.240*** 
 
(-3.449) (-3.446) 
Enroll -0.00281* 0.00350 
 
(-1.937) (1.184) 
Number Classes 0.0184 -0.127** 
  (0.709) (-1.985) 
Obs 3262 3262 
R-sq 0.549 0.451 
Cragg-Donald 
 
36.311 
 
 
Table IV.7 shows the effect of the 𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑘  on test score.  The first column 
reports estimates using OLS.  The coefficient on the sorting index is negative and 
significant, as it was in for the class sorting index in the previous table.  This 
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suggests that more sorting actually decreases students’ test scores.  However, when 
the third grade sorting index is used as an instrument, the 2SLS estimates reveal 
that a higher sorting index increases students’ scores.  The 2SLS results in the 
second column show that the sorting coefficient is positive, significant, and 
relatively large in magnitude.  An increase in the sorting index of a school of 0.1 
points is associated with a predicted score increase of 0.255 standard deviations. 
I also examine the difference in the sorting effect between high scorers and 
low scorers.  Table IV.8 presents OLS and 2SLS results by score type.  The OLS 
results are similar to the findings in Table IV.4, which show that a higher degree of 
sorting decreases scores for low scoring students but has no significant effect on 
high scoring students.  After using the instrument in the 2SLS results, however, it 
appears that more sorting significantly increases the test scores of both low scoring 
students and high scoring students.  An increase in the sorting index of 0.1 points 
increases predicted score for low scoring students by 0.268 standard deviations 
and increases predicted score for high scoring students by 0.243 standard 
deviations. 
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Table IV.8 
Alpha score sorting effect on math score by score type 
  OLS 2SLS 
Alpha Sort*(High Scorers) -0.131 2.681** 
 
(-1.229) (2.425) 
Alpha Sort*(Low Scorers) -0.372*** 2.431** 
 
(-3.493) (2.203) 
Class Size 0.00986 -0.00827 
 
(1.471) (-0.806) 
Previous Score 0.519*** 0.506*** 
 
(25.72) (22.00) 
Black -0.393*** -0.437*** 
 
(-6.434) (-6.283) 
Hispanic -0.230*** -0.225*** 
 
(-3.859) (-3.414) 
Asian 0.204* 0.281** 
 
(1.673) (2.038) 
G/T 0.445*** 0.331*** 
 
(14.07) (5.872) 
Free Lunch -0.0680** -0.0165 
 
(-1.979) (-0.385) 
Special Ed -0.214*** -0.238*** 
 
(-3.446) (-3.441) 
Enroll 
-
0.00320** 0.00308 
 
(-2.221) (1.052) 
Number Classes 0.0243 -0.120* 
  (0.942) (-1.900) 
Obs 3262 3262 
R-sq 0.555 0.458 
Cragg-Donald 
 
18.15 
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IV.5  Conclusions 
 
 While several studies have found that smaller class sizes significantly 
increase students’ test scores, one confounding factor may be the way in which 
schools sort students into classes.  Schools may sort specific types of students into 
larger or smaller classes, and schools that have smaller classes or more classes may 
be able to more effectively sort students into groups.  This study attempts to 
disentangle the class size effect from the sorting effect by creating a sorting index 
for schools, which captures how “sorted” its classes are.  I use a school’s previous 
grade sorting index as an instrument for the index of the grade of interest.   
While adding this sorting index does seem to affect the magnitude of the 
class size effect, it also presents several interesting implications of its own.  The OLS 
estimates of the effect of sorting indicate that more sorted schools actually hurt the 
scores of lower scoring students and that sorting G/T and non-G/T students into 
separate classes decreases the scores of non-G/T students.  However, after 
controlling the possible endogeneity of the sorting index caused by unobserved 
variables, I find that more sorting is actually helpful for all students, regardless of 
previous score or G/T classification.  
This study has valuable policy implications because unlike many school 
policy variables, the composition of classes can be changed with little need for 
increased funds.  A school with three classrooms and three teachers can increase 
efficiency by sorting students in such a way that they all benefit.  This study 
suggests that classes that are more sorted are beneficial for all students and that 
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schools may improve overall scores by sorting students into more homogeneous 
groups.     
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 This dissertation examines three issues related to the effect of smaller 
classes on student achievement.  Using student-level data from the Texas 
Assessment of Knowledge and Skills (TAKS), I explore heterogeneity in the effect of 
smaller classes across a score distribution of students, model class size effects 
simultaneously with moving effects, and disentangle the class size effect from 
schools’ decisions to divide students into classes.  The overall results from the 
paper emphasize the importance of carefully modeling these effects while 
simultaneously considering other potential confounding or related issues. 
 I find strong evidence of differences in the class size effect across different 
groups of students.  By dividing students into decile groups based on their previous 
testing performance and examining marginal effects for the different groups, I find 
that smaller classes are most helpful for student with low scores in the previous 
year.  While score gains for these students are significant, gains for higher scoring 
students are small or nonexistent.  Knowing how this effect varies across a score 
distribution is valuable information for teachers and school administrators who are 
faced with allocating students across classes.   
 In my analysis of moving decisions and class size, I also find differences in 
the class size effect between movers and nonmovers, and among movers of 
different types.  I find that movers respond more to class size reductions than 
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nonmovers, and that the strongest results exist for students who switch districts 
but remain in the same region of the state.   
 This simultaneous examination of the class size effect and the moving effect 
reveals a bias in the typical OLS or 2SLS estimates of the moving effect.  I create a 
two-type model that includes endogenous movers, who switch schools because of a 
school-related reason, and exogenous movers, who transfer schools because of a 
reason unrelated to school.  I find that students who are campus or district movers 
are more likely to be endogenous movers and that regional movers are more likely 
to be exogenous.  The endogenous campus movers perform worse than expected on 
the standardized exam, and the endogenous district movers perform better than 
expected on the exam.  This causes a bias in the overall moving effect for both 
campus and district movers.  These estimates show the importance of a 
simultaneous model of moving and class size. 
 My third paper is an analysis of the relationship between class size and class 
composition.  Using data from Dallas ISD, I estimate the class size effect along with 
the effect of sorting students into homogeneous groups.  The data is unique because 
it allows me to create the score distribution of an individual class, whereas most 
datasets only allow for the creation of a distribution of an entire grade within a 
school.   
I create a sorting index for each school, which is a measure of how similar or 
dissimilar the scores within the classes of the school are.  Because of potential 
endogeneity of the sorting index due to the fact that students are not divided into 
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classes randomly, I create an instrument for the fourth grade index using the third 
grade index.  It is reasonable to believe that the two indices are correlated if schools 
have common sorting guidelines across grades, but that the division of third grade 
students should not directly affect fourth grade scores.   
I include the sorting index in a typical class size regression and find that the 
magnitude of the class size coefficient decreases significantly, suggesting that what 
would have been labeled a class size effect is actually attributable to the sorting 
mechanism.  The coefficient of the sorting index itself suggests that students at 
schools with a more homogeneous sorting process have higher test scores.  This is 
true for both high scoring students and low scoring students; the results still hold 
when the effect is allowed to vary by previous test score.  This evidence indicates 
that students benefit from being divided into groups with classmates who are 
similar in academic achievement to themselves.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
THREE TYPE MOVING MODEL 
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In the full moving model, there are three types of movers—campus movers 
(type 1), district movers (type 2), and region movers (type 3).  I define the moving 
decision in the following way: 
 
Campus Move: 𝑚 = 1(𝑍𝑖𝜂1 + 𝜀1 > 0) 
District Move: 𝑚 = 1(𝑍𝑖𝜂2 + 𝜀2 > 0) 
Region Move:  𝑚 = 1(𝑍𝑖𝜂3 + 𝜀3 > 0) 
 
The score equation is given by   
𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 +  𝛾21𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝐶 + 𝛾22𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝐷 + 𝛾23𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑅 𝑐𝑠𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 . 
 
The covariances and errors of the three types of moves are described by the 
following equations:  
 
Campus Move: 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜀1, 𝑢𝑖) ≠ 0 𝜀1 = 𝜆1 + 𝑣1 and 𝜎𝑣1
2 = 1 − 𝜆1
2𝜎𝑢
2 
District Move: 𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝜀2, 𝑢𝑖 ≠ 0  𝜀2 = 𝜆2 + 𝑣2  and 𝜎𝑣2
2 = 1 − 𝜆2
2𝜎𝑢
2 
Region Move:  𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝜀3, 𝑢𝑖 ≠ 0  𝜀3 = 𝜆3 + 𝑣3  and 𝜎𝑣3
2 = 1 − 𝜆3
2𝜎𝑢
2 
 
Because potential movers of any type can move or stay, there are six possibilities: 
 
 Pr(moveC=1|𝑠𝑖𝑡) 
= Pr 𝑍𝑖𝜂1 + 𝜀1 > 0 𝑠𝑖𝑡 = Pr 𝑍𝑖𝜂1 + 𝜆1𝑢 + 𝑣1 > 0 𝑠𝑖𝑡 
= Φ  
𝑍𝑖𝜂1 + 𝜆1𝑢
 1 − 𝜆1
2𝜎𝑢2
  
 
= Φ  
𝑍𝑖𝜂1 + 𝜆1(𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 −  𝛾21𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝐶 𝑐𝑠𝑖)
 1 − 𝜆1
2𝜎𝑢2
  
 
 Pr(moveC=0|𝑠𝑖𝑡) 
= 1 − Φ  
𝑍𝑖𝜂1 + 𝜆1(𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 −  𝛾21𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝐶 𝑐𝑠𝑖)
 1 − 𝜆1
2𝜎𝑢2
  
 
 Pr(moveD=1|𝑠𝑖𝑡) 
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= Pr 𝑍𝑖𝜂2 + 𝜀2 > 0 𝑠𝑖𝑡 = Pr 𝑍𝑖𝜂2 + 𝜆2𝑢 + 𝑣2 > 0 𝑠𝑖𝑡 
= Φ  
𝑍𝑖𝜂2 + 𝜆2𝑢
 1 − 𝜆2
2𝜎𝑢2
  
= Φ  
𝑍𝑖𝜂2 + 𝜆2(𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 −  𝛾22𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝐷 𝑐𝑠𝑖)
 1 − 𝜆2
2𝜎𝑢2
  
 
 Pr(moveD=0|𝑠𝑖𝑡) 
= 1 − Φ  
𝑍𝑖𝜂2 + 𝜆2(𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 −  𝛾22𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝐷 𝑐𝑠𝑖)
 1 − 𝜆2
2𝜎𝑢2
  
 
 Pr(moveR=1|𝑠𝑖𝑡) 
= Pr 𝑍𝑖𝜂3 + 𝜀3 > 0 𝑠𝑖𝑡 = Pr 𝑍𝑖𝜂3 + 𝜆3𝑢 + 𝑣3 > 0 𝑠𝑖𝑡 
= Φ  
𝑍𝑖𝜂3 + 𝜆3𝑢
 1 − 𝜆3
2𝜎𝑢2
 
= Φ  
𝑍𝑖𝜂3 + 𝜆3(𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 −  𝛾23𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑅 𝑐𝑠𝑖)
 1 − 𝜆3
2𝜎𝑢2
  
 
 Pr(moveR=0|𝑠𝑖𝑡) 
= 1 − Φ  
𝑍𝑖𝜂3 + 𝜆3(𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 −  𝛾23𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑅 𝑐𝑠𝑖)
 1 − 𝜆3
2𝜎𝑢2
  
 
 
While we can distinguish between potential movers who actually move, we cannot 
distinguish between stayer types.  Therefore, the density functions are as follows: 
 
 𝑓(𝑠𝑖𝑡 ,moveC=1)= 
 Φ  
𝑍𝑖𝜂1 + 𝜆1(𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 −  𝛾21𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝐶 𝑐𝑠𝑖)
 1 − 𝜆1
2𝜎𝑢2
 
∗
1
𝜎𝑢
ϕ 
𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 −  𝛾21𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝐶 𝑐𝑠𝑖)
𝜎𝑢
  
 
 𝑓(𝑠𝑖𝑡 ,moveD=1)= 
 Φ  
𝑍𝑖𝜂2 + 𝜆2(𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 −  𝛾22𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝐷 𝑐𝑠𝑖)
 1 − 𝜆0
2𝜎𝑢2
 
∗
1
𝜎𝑢
ϕ 
𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 −  𝛾22𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝐷 𝑐𝑠𝑖)
𝜎𝑢
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 𝑓(𝑠𝑖𝑡 ,moveR=1)= 
 Φ  
𝑍𝑖𝜂3 + 𝜆3(𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 −  𝛾23𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑅 𝑐𝑠𝑖)
 1 − 𝜆0
2𝜎𝑢2
 
∗
1
𝜎𝑢
ϕ  
𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 −  𝛾23𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑅 𝑐𝑠𝑖)
𝜎𝑢
  
 
 𝑓(𝑠𝑖𝑡 ,move=0)= 
 1 − Φ  
𝑍𝑖𝜂1 + 𝜆1 𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 −  𝛾21𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝐶 𝑐𝑠𝑖 
 1 − 𝜆1
2𝜎𝑢2
 +  1
− Φ  
𝑍𝑖𝜂2 + 𝜆2(𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 −  𝛾22𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝐷 𝑐𝑠𝑖)
 1 − 𝜆2
2𝜎𝑢2
 + 1
− Φ  
𝑍𝑖𝜂3 + 𝜆3(𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 −  𝛾23𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑅 𝑐𝑠𝑖)
 1 − 𝜆3
2𝜎𝑢2
   
∗
1
𝜎𝑢
ϕ 
𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾1𝑐𝑠𝑖 −  𝛾21𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝐶 + 𝛾22𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝐷 + 𝛾23𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑅 𝑐𝑠𝑖)
𝜎𝑢
  
 
The log likelihood function for the maximum likelihood estimation is 
ℓ𝑖 =   log⁡(𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑘)
𝑁𝑘
𝑖=1
4
𝑘=1
. 
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APPENDIX B 
INDIVIDUAL SCHOOL REGRESSIONS FOR SCORE SORTING AND G/T SORTING
  
1
1
7
 
Table B1.1 
Score sorting for schools 101-113 
Dependent Variable: Raw Math Score (2004) 
School 101 103 104 105 106 108 109 110 112 113 
Constant 28.79*** 30.82*** 29.24*** 31.89*** 27.60*** 24.11*** 28.80*** 28.95*** 30.85*** 32.29*** 
 
(13.47) (24.01) (19.88) (23.34) (14.34) (11.16) (17.00) (20.11) (19.86) (28.06) 
Class 2 -3.119 -0.529 0.174 -2.332 4.733* 6.333** 1.200 -0.619 -0.179 0.614 
 
(-1.050) (-0.292) (0.0790) (-1.154) (1.816) (2.393) (0.535) (-0.278) (-0.088) (0.345) 
Class 3 -5.016 1.301 -0.683 -1.784 
 
4.278 0.0947 0.860 0.804 
 
 
(-1.629) (0.706) (-0.315) (-0.911) 
 
(1.616) (0.0418) (0.393) (0.403) 
 Class 4 -0.661 1.093 -1.888 
   
2.311 1.548 -1.199 
 
 
(-0.226) (0.548) (-0.897) 
   
(1.007) (0.707) (-0.581) 
 Class 5 -0.319 
 
0.429 
     
-0.146 
 
 
(-0.107) 
 
(0.198) 
     
(-0.073) 
 Class 6 -1.357 
       
-19.9*** 
   (-0.449)               (-4.666)   
Obs 87 62 94 53 22 45 72 68 90 24 
R-Sq 0.048 0.022 0.016 0.029 0.142 0.120 0.021 0.015 0.233 0.005 
  
1
1
8
 
Table B1.2 
Score sorting for schools 114-125 
Dependent Variable: Raw Math Score (2004) 
School 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 124 125 
Constant 30.32*** 28.95*** 31.29*** 32.65*** 28.41*** 33.27*** 29.67*** 25.80*** 30.69*** 31.16*** 
 
(468.4) (19.43) (24.46) (23.03) (18.28) (26.09) (17.02) (17.31) (24.92) (25.71) 
Class 2 3.433** 1.850 1.888 -0.923 1.882 0.733 0.167 4.494** 2.719 1.136 
 
(2.236) (0.878) (0.925) (-0.471) (0.857) (0.413) (0.0706) (2.197) (1.662) (0.644) 
Class 3 1.183 2.828 -1 -2.706 
 
-2.443 1.649 3.700 2.367 0.898 
 
(0.731) (1.307) (-0.553) (-1.314) 
 
(-1.397) (0.707) (1.655) (1.446) (0.517) 
Class 4 
 
0.574 1.920 -5.496** 
 
-2.425 2.667 
  
2.564 
  
(0.276) (1.009) (-2.433) 
 
(-1.422) (1.082) 
  
(1.476) 
Class 5 
  
1.143 -1.826 
 
-0.642 
   
0.430 
   
(0.622) (-0.873) 
 
(-0.362) 
   
(0.244) 
Class 6 
  
0.143 -4.286** 
     
1.405 
   
(0.0780) (-2.188) 
     
(0.784) 
Class 7 
  
1.306 0.739 
      
   
(0.699) (0.359) 
      Class 8 
  
-0.937 
             (-0.492)               
Obs 11273 79 120 130 34 83 67 44 47 105 
R-Sq 0.000 0.027 0.043 0.096 0.022 0.068 0.026 0.114 0.067 0.025 
  
1
1
9
 
Table B1.3 
Score sorting for schools 126-135 
Dependent Variable: Raw Math Score (2004) 
School 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 
Constant 32.69*** 30.50*** 33.55*** 32.83*** 28.31*** 28.73*** 34.27*** 32.82*** 34.60*** 32.59*** 
 
(22.90) (14.60) (19.56) (25.40) (15.82) (13.39) (31.20) (24.31) (14.82) (29.43) 
Class 2 -1.288 -1.500 0.330 -2.721 0.217 -1.894 -1.267 -0.350 0.567 2.412 
 
(-0.672) (-0.490) (0.148) (-1.416) (0.0870) (-0.638) (-0.841) (-0.188) (0.179) (1.562) 
Class 3 -1.158 
  
-1.445 1.500 -3.182 
 
-1.824 -4.933 1.471 
 
(-0.582) 
  
(-0.772) (0.593) (-1.049) 
 
(-0.908) (-1.294) (0.939) 
Class 4 0.312 
  
-
5.159*** -1.136 -1.035 
 
-1.297 -1.100 
 
 
(0.161) 
  
(-2.645) (-0.456) (-0.355) 
 
(-0.698) (-0.314) 
 Class 5 -2.902 
   
1.570 -5.427* 
 
-1.294 -2.200 
 
 
(-1.389) 
   
(0.630) (-1.745) 
 
(-0.678) (-0.666) 
 Class 6 -3.988* 
   
-0.0903 
   
-1.600 
 
 
(-1.733) 
   
(-0.037) 
   
(-0.485) 
 Class 7 -8.56*** 
   
1.621 
   
-2.00 
 
 
(-3.464) 
   
(0.630) 
   
(-0.606) 
 Class 8 0.786 
   
1.438 
   
0.733 
 
 
(0.406) 
   
(0.568) 
   
(0.192) 
 Class 9 
    
-1.839 
               (-0.757)           
Obs 123 15 27 75 151 57 32 86 36 52 
R-Sq 0.155 0.018 0.001 0.000 0.030 0.066 0.023 0.015 0.103 0.048 
  
1
2
0
 
Table B1.4 
Score sorting for schools 136-148 
Dependent Variable: Raw Math Score (2004) 
School 136 137 139 140 141 142 144 145 147 148 
Constant 29.93*** 29.40*** 30.18*** 28.67*** 31.91*** 32.88*** 31.57*** 31.50*** 30.77*** 33.42*** 
 
(15.23) (16.81) (19.38) (16.60) (18.47) (15.85) (18.86) (20.80) (17.27) (21.85) 
Class 2 -1.823 2.306 0.718 0.256 -0.909 -0.952 0.929 0.857 1.842 -5.217* 
 
(-0.704) (0.961) (0.318) (0.107) (-0.353) (-0.361) (0.358) (0.432) (0.788) (-1.850) 
Class 3 -1.634 1.100 3.091 1 
 
-0.375 1.012 -0.375 0.168 -2.639 
 
(-0.616) (0.475) (1.404) (0.379) 
 
(-0.144) (0.411) (-0.165) (0.0701) (-1.130) 
Class 4 -4.693* 
 
2.068 
  
-0.625 -2.038 -2.300 -1.969 
 
 
(-1.769) 
 
(0.959) 
  
(-0.213) (-0.875) (-1.074) (-0.809) 
 Class 5 
       
0.750 2.159 
 
        
(0.366) (0.873) 
 Class 6 
       
1.643 0.0543 
 
        
(0.828) (0.0229) 
 Class 7 
       
2.233 -0.894 
 
        
(1.142) (-0.373) 
 Class 8 
       
1.794 
                  (0.940)     
Obs 67 52 44 34 20 43 51 100 109 26 
R-Sq 0.051 0.019 0.055 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.042 0.075 0.044 0.138 
  
1
2
1
 
Table B1.5 
Score sorting for schools 149-161 
Dependent Variable: Raw Math Score (2004) 
School 149 150 152 153 156 157 158 159 160 161 
Constant 28.44*** 30.85*** 30.22*** 34.07*** 27.71*** 28.63*** 32.06*** 30.69*** 32*** 26.95*** 
 
(13.40) (19.90) (16.75) (27.64) (17.17) (20.37) (23.69) (21.35) (18.25) (16.30) 
Class 2 2.368 -0.275 -5.500** 0.656 2.571 2.563 0.938 2.912 1.273 0.598 
 
(0.892) (-0.128) (-2.155) (0.353) (1.126) (1.290) (0.473) (1.256) (0.513) (0.265) 
Class 3 3.006 
 
-0.500 -0.571 4.345* 1.508 -1.262 4.131* 
 
0.653 
 
(1.176) 
 
(-0.196) (-0.338) (1.993) (0.747) (-0.649) (1.834) 
 
(0.283) 
Class 4 3.079 
 
-2.294 -3.148* 2.286 
 
-0.562 0.236 
 
-1.241 
 
(1.214) 
 
(-0.841) (-1.772) (1.001) 
 
(-0.258) (0.110) 
 
(-0.516) 
Class 5 
  
-2.696 
 
4.050* 
 
1 1.812 
 
-0.526 
   
(-1.071) 
 
(1.858) 
 
(0.522) (0.825) 
 
(-0.225) 
Class 6 
  
-3.522 
   
2.622 0.812 
  
   
(-1.416) 
   
(1.427) (0.370) 
  Class 7 
      
2.838 
                 (1.563)       
Obs 66 27 107 54 76 47 110 74 22 97 
R-Sq 0.027 0.001 0.059 0.090 0.065 0.037 0.072 0.066 0.013 0.010 
  
1
2
2
 
Table B1.6 
Score sorting for schools 162-173 
Dependent Variable: Raw Math Score (2004) 
School 162 163 164 166 167 168 169 170 171 173 
Constant 35.53*** 31.44*** 29.75*** 27.24*** 28.71*** 31.67*** 31.47*** 32.53*** 31.84*** 31.18*** 
 
(26.29) (21.74) (21.75) (20.76) (15.67) (13.88) (31.71) (21.04) (24.55) (27.67) 
Class 2 -0.304 0.614 2.250 -3.435 1.590 -5.167* 5.533*** 1.400 1.325 0.369 
 
(-0.157) (0.296) (1.148) (-1.593) (0.684) (-1.767) (3.943) (0.640) (0.712) (0.246) 
Class 3 -0.241 3.489 2.039 4.820*** 0.391 -1.917 1.950 -1.004 0.720 0.516 
 
(-0.129) (1.626) (1.040) (2.635) (0.162) (-0.672) (1.310) (-0.473) (0.375) (0.301) 
Class 4 
  
1.050 3.965** -0.714 -2 3.176** -0.800 -0.0421 0.0543 
   
(0.502) (2.222) (-0.302) (-0.620) (2.224) (-0.366) (-0.023) (0.0317) 
Class 5 
  
0.179 5.615*** 1.230 -1.792 4.033*** 
  
0.585 
   
(0.0838) (3.146) (0.504) (-0.628) (2.709) 
  
(0.386) 
Class 6 
  
0.309 4.065** 
 
-2.810 1.200 
  
4.118** 
   
(0.153) (2.278) 
 
(-0.961) (0.740) 
  
(2.584) 
Class 7 
         
3.706** 
          
(2.326) 
Class 8 
         
4.192*** 
                    (2.703) 
Obs 58 50 120 105 95 78 77 62 73 139 
R-Sq 0.001 0.059 0.024 0.217 0.017 0.049 0.211 0.026 0.011 0.138 
  
1
2
3
 
Table B1.7 
Score sorting for schools 174-187 
Dependent Variable: Raw Math Score (2004) 
School 175 178 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 
Constant 29.71*** 31.18*** 29.49*** 30.85*** 29.54*** 29.38*** 33.25*** 34.19*** 26.10*** 30.69*** 
 
(17.35) (21.43) (29.96) (22.43) (17.65) (19.80) (27.20) (27.08) (13.18) (18.69) 
Class 2 -1.581 0.474 1.625 0.150 1.662 2.292 -0.558 -0.688 1.233 0.187 
 
(-0.643) (0.239) (0.944) (0.0630) (0.727) (1.124) (-0.305) (-0.372) (0.460) (0.0808) 
Class 3 -3.143 -0.176 2.980 -3.500* -0.681 -1.606 
  
4.900* 0.312 
 
(-1.278) (-0.087) (1.626) (-1.799) (-0.293) (-0.725) 
  
(1.890) (0.125) 
Class 4 
   
-1.203 0.395 0.692 
  
6.054** 1.455 
    
(-0.593) (0.173) (0.324) 
  
(2.298) (0.606) 
Class 5 
   
-0.750 -0.0679 
     
    
(-0.386) 
(-
0.0305) 
     Class 6 
    
1.873 
               (0.843)           
Obs 49 55 70 87 91 62 29 30 49 58 
R-Sq 0.034 0.002 0.041 0.048 0.025 0.055 0.003 0.005 0.143 0.008 
  
1
2
4
 
Table B1.8 
Score sorting for schools 189-199 
Dependent Variable: Raw Math Score (2004) 
School 189 190 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 
Constant 32.86*** 29.58*** 27.94*** 31.63*** 26.09*** 31.27*** 28.67*** 26.36*** 33.87*** 32.60*** 
 
(24.92) (22.58) (17.99) (18.35) (24.45) (22.33) (23.51) (15.90) (21.93) (27.69) 
Class 2 -1.197 5.350*** -1.592 -3.807 0.0144 -1.267 4.500** 6.734*** -1.717 1.295 
 
(-0.578) (3.044) (-0.714) (-1.410) (0.00916) (-0.588) (2.609) (2.695) (-0.840) (0.822) 
Class 3 -2.564 5.512*** 2.371 -3.092 1.623 3.358* 1.905 2.643 -3.631* 0.0667 
 
(-1.341) (3.356) (1.094) (-1.248) (1.063) (1.723) (1.033) (1.083) (-1.714) (0.0377) 
Class 4 
 
4.226** 1.056 -8.125** 10.82*** -10.27** 
 
2.00 
 
-0.600 
  
(2.573) (0.466) (-2.462) (5.854) (-2.515) 
 
(0.853) 
 
(-0.366) 
Class 5 
    
11.65*** 5.633** 
    
     
(7.430) (2.545) 
    Class 6 
    
10.99*** 5.933*** 
              (6.275) (2.680)         
Obs 57 69 70 48 105 64 50 51 52 62 
R-Sq 0.032 0.166 0.050 0.128 0.542 0.318 0.127 0.137 0.057 0.027 
  
1
2
5
 
Table B1.9 
Score sorting for schools 200-210 
Dependent Variable: Raw Math Score (2004) 
School 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 209 210 
Constant 31.57*** 37.21*** 28.83*** 32.92*** 30.39*** 27.50*** 30.93*** 26.20*** 30.61*** 33.06*** 
 
(11.59) (30.60) (15.18) (17.81) (15.77) (20.90) (19.76) (12.09) (17.34) (24.01) 
Class 2 -1.264 -2.481 -4.333 -4.462 -2.330 2.342 -0.227 1.752 -0.401 -1.184 
 
(-0.374) (-1.467) (-1.613) (-1.670) (-0.843) (1.275) (-0.106) (0.665) (-0.163) (-0.599) 
Class 3 2.429 -1.571 -0.611 0.0119 -3.222 2.111 0.844 6.326** 0.742 -0.614 
 
(0.719) (-0.914) (-0.211) (0.00473) (-1.182) (1.134) (0.398) (2.362) (0.293) (-0.320) 
Class 4 -5.143 0.695 0.917 0.0208 -2.514 1.600 
 
6.700** -2.842 -0.427 
 
(-1.335) (0.379) (0.341) (0.00852) (-0.895) (0.882) 
 
(2.523) (-1.042) (-0.225) 
Class 5 -1.446 -2.00 
 
-3.917 -0.0948 4.500** 
 
4.943* -1.361 -2.121 
 
(-0.443) (-1.163) 
 
(-1.060) (-0.034) (2.509) 
 
(1.741) (-0.428) (-1.073) 
Class 6 
 
-1.786 
 
-2.583 
 
2.833 
    
  
(-1.038) 
 
(-0.807) 
 
(1.580) 
    Class 7 
   
-7.917 
              (-1.619)             
Obs 56 82 45 65 86 117 50 84 75 103 
R-Sq 0.096 0.059 0.097 0.114 0.028 0.058 0.006 0.123 0.027 0.017 
  
1
2
6
 
Table B1.10 
Score sorting for schools 211-220 
Dependent Variable: Raw Math Score (2004) 
School 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 
Constant 28.7*** 32.42*** 30.44*** 33.25*** 32.27*** 14.83*** 37.58*** 29*** 32.14*** 30.36*** 
 
(20.78) (23.33) (20.97) (17.91) (18.64) (6.286) (89.17) (18.43) (21.23) (23.31) 
Class 2 1.872 -2.417 -0.490 -0.712 -1.267 10.11*** 0.532 1.083 -4.078* 5.186*** 
 
(0.879) (-0.580) (-0.249) (-0.276) (-0.547) (3.319) (0.881) (0.459) (-1.779) (2.747) 
Class 3 1.800 -0.0167 1.096 -1.517 1.633 10.77*** 0.0526 2.00 -3.136 -2.056 
 
(0.880) (-0.0050) (0.525) (-0.609) (0.713) (3.401) (0.0883) (0.883) (-1.345) (-0.962) 
Class 4 -1.750 -1.560 2.125 -0.250 1.322 8.325*** 
 
0.125 -0.397 3.636* 
 
(-0.80) (-0.533) (1.035) (-0.095) (0.556) (2.762) 
 
(0.0571) (-0.188) (1.926) 
Class 5 1.863 0.0119 
 
-2.679 
 
8.778*** 
 
0.647 
 
-4.481** 
 
(0.941) (0.00407) 
 
(-1.059) 
 
(2.881) 
 
(0.300) 
 
(-2.271) 
Class 6 
   
-1.139 
 
12.54*** 
 
0.667 
  
    
(-0.402) 
 
(4.018) 
 
(0.313) 
  Class 7 
     
12.50*** 
 
0.118 
  
      
(4.103) 
 
(0.0545) 
  Class 8 
       
-0.0625 
                  (-0.029)     
Obs 75 46 66 75 71 116 56 125 78 92 
R-Sq 0.055 0.014 0.032 0.021 0.032 0.167 0.017 0.011 0.058 0.260 
  
1
2
7
 
Table B1.11 
Score sorting for schools 222-233 
Dependent Variable: Raw Math Score (2004) 
School 222 223 224 225 226 228 229 230 232 233 
Constant 24.69*** 29.92*** 32*** 26.25*** 24.38*** 30.20*** 32.93*** 30.93*** 28.82*** 36.55*** 
 
(12.21) (20.33) (13.36) (14.14) (12.34) (22.32) (27.87) (21.02) (19.54) (30.00) 
Class 2 2.262 1.896 -2.263 1.295 2.615 
 
1.127 0.0667 1.353 -2.962* 
 
(0.834) (0.974) (-0.81) (0.445) (1.008) 
 
(0.715) (0.0302) (0.649) (-1.757) 
Class 3 0.963 
 
-1.789 -2.625 3.668 
 
1.601 -3.206 0.598 -1.084 
 
(0.355) 
 
(-0.64) (-1.000) (1.430) 
 
(1.003) (-1.417) (0.294) (-0.655) 
Class 4 1.523 
  
2.515 4.715* 
 
1.214 3.924* 0.248 -1.636 
 
(0.555) 
  
(0.972) (1.857) 
 
(0.727) (1.853) (0.113) (-0.950) 
Class 5 0.693 
  
-1.917 
  
2.134 
 
1.954 
 
 
(0.258) 
  
(-0.676) 
  
(1.319) 
 
(0.950) 
 Class 6 2.513 
     
1.302 
 
2.614 
   (0.926)           (0.765)   (1.234)   
Obs 116 28 45 72 70 15 92 52 101 47 
R-Sq 0.012 0.035 0.015 0.070 0.053 0.000 0.021 0.171 0.024 0.070 
  
1
2
8
 
Table B1.12 
Score sorting for schools 235-263 
Dependent Variable: Raw Math Score (2004) 
School 235 236 237 241 250 251 256 259 262 263 
Constant 23.33*** 29.87*** 30.47*** 27** 29.17*** 33.38*** 29.77*** 26.11*** 33*** 32.13*** 
 
(13.22) (18.72) (16.63) (3.792) (16.33) (18.85) (17.92) (9.054) (23.67) (18.02) 
Class 2 3.167 -2.067 -1.538 -1.500 4.657* -0.108 -3.133 
 
-1.846 0.337 
 
(1.289) (-0.916) (-0.583) (-0.12) (1.996) (-0.043) (-1.277) 
 
(-0.96) (0.138) 
Class 3 0.881 1.210 -6.333** 
 
0.141 -3.480 
  
0.444 0.200 
 
(0.347) (0.517) (-2.444) 
 
(0.0569) (-1.448) 
  
(0.209) (0.0793) 
Class 4 
 
1.192 -2.967 
  
-8.45*** 
  
1.600 
 
  
(0.545) (-1.163) 
  
(-3.195) 
  
(0.774) 
 Class 5 
  
2.462 
  
-2.063 
  
-0.0909 
 
   
(0.934) 
  
(-0.823) 
  
(-0.05) 
 Class 6 
  
0.248 
  
-4.691* 
  
-1.455 
 
   
(0.0939) 
  
(-1.951) 
  
(-0.72) 
 Class 7 
  
-1.252 
       
   
(-0.475) 
       Class 8 
  
-3.114 
             (-1.239)               
Obs 45 60 119 7 42 98 24 9 66 47 
R-Sq 0.041 0.048 0.115 0.008 0.125 0.136 0.069 0.000 0.059 0.000 
  
1
2
9
 
Table B1.13 
Score sorting for schools 264-274 
Dependent Variable: Raw Math Score (2004) 
School 264 265 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 
Constant 29.94*** 31.33*** 32.50*** 33.18*** 28.33*** 32.93*** 32.50*** 30.32*** 33.28*** 33.26*** 
 
(14.63) (18.65) (12.04) (39.12) (16.69) (24.19) (25.97) (21.51) (21.09) (25.60) 
Class 2 -0.854 -2.976 2.722 0.218 1.667 -0.670 -2.286 -3.649 -2.468 -0.311 
 
(-0.273) (-1.231) (0.839) (0.111) (0.655) (-0.368) (-1.208) (-1.611) (-1.148) (-0.173) 
Class 3 -1.028 -2.833 2.900 0.532 4.417* 2.008 0.676 -0.941 -0.178 -4.93*** 
 
(-0.321) (-1.172) (0.908) (0.233) (1.967) (1.075) (0.377) (-0.451) (-0.082) (-2.646) 
Class 4 -1.553 
 
-0.800 0.318 2.258 0.305 -0.618 1.474 -7.17*** -2.368 
 
(-0.508) 
 
(-0.251) (0.161) (1.026) (0.171) (-0.344) (0.739) (-3.258) (-1.289) 
Class 5 1.370 
 
5.125 -2.848 
 
-0.121 -1.437 1.906 -1.444 -1.541 
 
(0.448) 
 
(1.550) (-1.555) 
 
(-0.064) (-0.788) (0.944) (-0.647) (-0.827) 
Class 6 
  
-0.500 0.374 
 
-0.0510 0.250 1.518 -2.219 -1.541 
   
(-0.151) (0.182) 
 
(-0.027) (0.137) (0.751) (-0.980) (-0.827) 
Class 7 
  
-4.125 -4.455** 
 
1.178 -0.222 -1.907 
 
-1.854 
   
(-1.248) (-2.349) 
 
(0.639) (-0.126) (-0.991) 
 
(-1.045) 
Class 8 
   
-2.807 
 
0.773 0.0385 
   
    
(-1.298) 
 
(0.414) (0.0199) 
   Class 9 
   
-4.727** 
              (-2.493)             
Obs 65 43 57 122 69 140 129 124 113 135 
R-Sq 0.016 0.046 0.241 0.113 0.058 0.024 0.029 0.083 0.119 0.067 
  
1
3
0
 
Table B1.14 
Score sorting for schools 275-284 
Dependent Variable: Raw Math Score (2004) 
School 275 276 277 280 281 283 284 
Constant 26.78*** 29.89*** 23.92*** 32*** 30.53*** 31.37*** 29.08*** 
 
(20.76) (20.01) (12.82) (25.73) (17.55) (20.89) (19.63) 
Class 2 6.022*** 4.817** 3.294 -0.400 1.217 0.520 1.506 
 
(3.387) (2.247) (1.382) (-0.21) (0.502) (0.255) (0.705) 
Class 3 7.139*** 0.0397 5.655** 3.444* 0.467 1.275 3.923* 
 
(4.183) (0.0176) (2.224) (1.771) (0.186) (0.633) (1.793) 
Class 4 5.813*** 2.040 5.672** 0.231 -0.533 1.272 4.559** 
 
(3.342) (0.903) (2.328) (0.131) (-0.217) (0.608) (2.084) 
Class 5 -1.232 4.799** 3.028 -1.714 -0.475 
  
 
(-0.588) (2.204) (1.257) (-0.99) (-0.199) 
  Class 6 
 
2.549 
 
1.889 1.400 
  
  
(1.170) 
 
(0.971) (0.569) 
  Class 7 
    
1.921 
            (0.718)     
Obs 95 95 80 69 103 72 47 
R-Sq 0.265 0.095 0.086 0.123 0.018 0.008 0.116 
 
  
1
3
1
 
Table B2.1: Schools 101-113 
G/T sorting for schools 101-113 
Dependent Variable: Gifted/Talented (Probit Regression1) 
School 101 103 104 105 106 108† 109 110 112† 113 
Class 2 -0.0845 -0.075 0.0954 0.127 0.318** 
 
0.0300 -0.075 
 
-0.036 
 
(-0.942) (-0.63) (0.768) (0.952) (1.978) 
 
(0.209) (-0.63) 
 
(-0.23) 
Class 3 -0.0270 -0.025 0.146 0.105 
 
-0.32** 0.0300 0.225* -0.0038 
 
 
(-0.287) (-0.21) (1.159) (0.818) 
 
(-2.30) (0.209) (1.668) (-0.031) 
 Class 4 0.00646 -0.066 -0.028 
   
0.126 0.259* 0.0120 
 
 
(0.0683) (-0.55) (-0.23) 
   
(0.869) (1.932) (0.100) 
 Class 5 -0.0379 
 
0.195 
     
-0.147 
 
 
(-0.418) 
 
(1.518) 
     
(-1.276) 
 Class 6 -0.0327 
       
-0.154 
   (-0.354)               (-1.352)   
Obs 111 77 112 60 28 43 82 82 108 30 
1Reported with marginal effects 
       †These schools have at least one class with zero G/T students. 
    
‡These schools have at least one class with all G/T students. 
     
  
1
3
2
 
Table B2.2 
G/T sorting for schools 114-125 
Dependent Variable: Gifted/Talented (Probit Regression1) 
School 114 115 116† 117† 118 119 120† 121 124 125 
Class 2 -0.083 0.0687 
  
0.0151 -0.0237 
 
0.216 0.0605 -0.0626 
 
(-0.71) (0.517) 
  
(0.160) (-0.19) 
 
(1.393) (0.362) (-0.64) 
Class 3 -0.083 0.175 -0.0487 -0.118 
 
-0.0368 0.269* 0.0596 0.225 -0.106 
 
(-0.71) (1.330) (-0.44) (-1.011) 
 
(-0.29) (1.762) (0.381) (1.398) (-1.11) 
Class 4 
 
0.0280 0.216* 0.00860 
 
-0.0368 0.336** 
  
-0.0562 
  
(0.208) (1.831) (0.0689) 
 
(-0.30) (2.163) 
  
(-0.57) 
Class 5 
  
0.121 0.0438 
 
-0.183 
   
-0.0143 
   
(1.017) (0.352) 
 
(-1.48) 
   
(-0.14) 
Class 6 
  
-0.0487 -0.0612 
     
-0.0494 
   
(-0.44) (-0.513) 
     
(-0.49) 
Class 7 
  
-0.0487 0.180 
      
   
(-0.44) (1.392) 
      Class 8 
  
-0.0554 
             (-0.52)               
Obs 67 91 144 136 49 97 62 57 56 124 
1Reported with marginal effects 
       †These schools have at least one class with zero G/T students. 
    ‡These schools have at least one class with all G/T students. 
     
  
1
3
3
 
Table B2.3 
G/T sorting for schools 126-135 
Dependent Variable: Gifted/Talented (Probit Regression1) 
School 126 127 128 129 130† 131 132 133 134† 135 
Class 2 0.0548 -0.222 0.175 -0.09 
 
-0.0212 0.0779 0.0224 
 
0.0780 
 
(0.603) (-1.36) (1.238) (-0.88) 
 
(-0.188) (0.710) (0.173) 
 
(0.547) 
Class 3 -0.026 
  
0.0309 
 
0.0582 
 
-0.194 0.263 -0.092 
 
(-0.32) 
  
(0.298) 
 
(0.483) 
 
(-1.43) (0.858) (-0.63) 
Class 4 0.0151 
  
-0.042 0.0159 0.0472 
 
0.0443 -0.101 
 
 
(0.176) 
  
(-0.41) (0.154) (0.401) 
 
(0.348) (-0.30) 
 Class 5 -0.073 
   
0.00486 0.00310 
 
0.176 -0.200 
 
 
(-0.95) 
   
(0.0488) (0.0258) 
 
(1.231) (-0.63) 
 Class 6 -0.065 
   
-0.0461 
   
0.00 
 
 
(-0.81) 
   
(-0.469) 
   
(-0.00) 
 Class 7 -0.071 
   
0.0223 
   
-0.404 
 
 
(-0.91) 
   
(0.211) 
   
(-1.28) 
 Class 8 0.0476 
   
0.159 
   
0.0693 
 
 
(0.535) 
   
(1.368) 
   
(0.189) 
 Class 9 
    
0.0101 
     
     
(0.100) 
     
Obs 171 27 37 89 139 89 47 98 33 67 
1Reported with marginal effects 
       †These schools have at least one class with zero G/T students. 
    ‡These schools have at least one class with all G/T students. 
     
  
1
3
4
 
Table B2.4 
G/T sorting for schools 136-148 
Dependent Variable: Gifted/Talented (Probit Regression1) 
School 136 137 139 140 141 142 144 145† 147† 148 
Class 2 0.103 0.402*** 0.173 0.430** 0.124 0.0850 0.0791 
  
-0.38** 
 
(0.769) (2.616) (0.865) (2.223) (0.970) (0.506) (0.625) 
  
(-2.50) 
Class 3 0.0611 0.104 0.00 0.293 
 
0.124 0.153 -0.091 0.201 -0.147 
 
(0.452) (0.662) (-0.00) (1.544) 
 
(0.745) (1.142) (-0.80) (1.398) (-1.04) 
Class 4 0.0486 
 
0.141 
  
0.00 -0.073 0.0388 0.0147 
 
 
(0.366) 
 
(0.721) 
  
(-0.00) (-0.60) (0.325) (0.111) 
 Class 5 
       
-0.028 0.0719 
 
        
(-0.25) (0.539) 
 Class 6 
       
0.123 -0.012 
 
        
(0.947) (-0.10) 
 Class 7 
       
0.149 0.171 
 
        
(1.171) (1.242) 
 Class 8 
       
0.0388 
  
        
(0.325) 
  Obs 80 58 49 43 35 63 67 130 117 45 
1Reported with marginal effects 
       †These schools have at least one class with zero G/T students. 
    ‡These schools have at least one class with all G/T students. 
     
  
1
3
5
 
Table B2.5 
G/T sorting for schools 149-161 
Dependent Variable: Gifted/Talented (Probit Regression1) 
School 149 150 152† 153 156 157 158 159† 160 161 
Class 2 0.0966 -0.143 
 
0.0344 0.0964 0.0711 0.164 
 
0.0523 0.0368 
 
(0.678) (-0.92) 
 
(0.332) (0.598) (0.479) (1.100) 
 
(0.551) (0.334) 
Class 3 0.292** 
 
0.0151 0.0872 0.0654 0.300** -0.00841 0.0421 
 
-0.051 
 
(2.031) 
 
(0.208) (0.810) (0.421) (1.983) (-0.061) (0.400) 
 
(-0.49) 
Class 4 0.247* 
 
0.0180 -0.120 0.143 
 
-0.0765 0.168 
 
-0.130 
 
(1.727) 
 
(0.243) (-1.12) (0.895) 
 
(-0.550) (1.483) 
 
(-1.23) 
Class 5 
  
0.0719 
 
0.126 
 
0.164 -0.051 
 
-0.036 
   
(0.887) 
 
(0.801) 
 
(1.100) (-0.52) 
 
(-0.34) 
Class 6 
  
0.0125 
   
0.108 0.0856 
  
   
(0.174) 
   
(0.747) (0.827) 
  Class 7 
      
0.0965 
                 (0.678)       
Obs 90 28 111 87 87 56 128 104 35 113 
1Reported with marginal effects 
       †These schools have at least one class with zero G/T students. 
     ‡These schools have at least one class with all G/T students. 
     
  
1
3
6
 
Table B2.6 
G/T sorting for schools 162-173 
Dependent Variable: Gifted/Talented (Probit Regression1) 
School 162 163 164 166† 167† 168 169 170† 171 173† 
Class 2 0.132 0.0652 0.0650 
  
-0.0062 0.500*** 
 
-0.083 
 
 
(0.930) (0.492) (0.474) 
  
(-0.058) (3.106) 
 
(-0.64) 
 Class 3 0.250* 0.0772 -0.0253 0.994*** 0.00682 0.0605 0.123 -0.094 -0.059 -0.0720 
 
(1.795) (0.572) (-0.189) (10.09) (0.0585) (0.572) (0.737) (-0.79) (-0.44) (-0.453) 
Class 4 
  
-0.131 0.994*** 0.0823 -0.0820 0.241 -0.054 -0.053 -0.211 
   
(-0.974) (10.09) (0.710) (-0.830) (1.466) (-0.46) (-0.41) (-1.297) 
Class 5 
  
-0.164 0.990*** 0.0560 -0.0286 0.413** 
  
-0.127 
   
(-1.273) (9.429) (0.475) (-0.287) (2.492) 
  
(-0.785) 
Class 6 
  
-0.0569 0.957 
 
-0.0771 
   
0.413** 
   
(-0.425) 
  
(-0.769) 
   
(2.517) 
Class 7 
  
0.00797 
      
0.447*** 
   
(0.0575) 
      
(2.809) 
          
0.640*** 
          
(4.014) 
Obs 71 57 145 105 91 108 61 91 141 53 
1Reported with marginal effects 
       †These schools have at least one class with zero G/T students. 
     ‡These schools have at least one class with all G/T students. 
     
  
1
3
7
 
Table B2.7 
G/T sorting for schools 174-186 
Dependent Variable: Gifted/Talented (Probit Regression1) 
School 174 175 178 180 181 182† 183 184 185 186 
Class 2 0.177 0.0409 -0.0573 0.0631 0.00 
 
-0.21** 0.00294 -0.204 0.177 
 
(1.060) (0.514) (-0.40) (0.560) (-0.00) 
 
(-2.16) (0.0187) (-1.64) (1.070) 
Class 3 0.231 0.00 0.114 0.241** -0.00362 
 
-0.21** 
  
0.104 
 
(1.388) (-0.00) (0.784) (2.018) (-0.034) 
 
(-2.23) 
  
(0.638) 
Class 4 
    
0.133 -0.177* -0.132 
  
0.177 
     
(1.089) (-1.74) (-1.38) 
  
(1.070) 
Class 5 
    
0.252* -0.088 
              (1.939) (-0.95)         
Obs 62 62 84 106 80 59 81 37 43 62 
1Reported with marginal effects 
       †These schools have at least one class with zero G/T students. 
     ‡These schools have at least one class with all G/T students. 
     
  
1
3
8
 
Table B2.8 
G/T sorting for schools 187-198 
Dependent Variable: Gifted/Talented (Probit Regression1) 
School 187 189 190 192 193 194‡ 195† 196 197† 198 
Class 2 -0.044 0.0529 0.199 -0.0463 -0.0926 
  
0.500*** 
 
-0.0127 
 
(-0.42) (0.408) (1.145) (-0.469) (-0.96) 
  
(3.154) 
 
(-0.095) 
Class 3 -0.098 0.143 0.314* 0.103 -0.142 
  
0.00648 -0.039 -0.0354 
 
(-0.95) (1.171) (1.766) (1.002) (-1.51) 
  
(0.0393) (-0.41) (-0.258) 
Class 4 -0.051 
 
0.329* 0.00976 -0.21** -0.191 0.609*** 
 
-0.099 
 
 
(-0.49) 
 
(1.892) (0.100) (-2.10) (-1.255) (3.788) 
 
(-1.00) 
 Class 5 
     
0.151 0.628*** 
   
      
(1.112) (3.367) 
   Class 6 
     
0.679*** 0.372** 
   
      
(3.819) (2.049) 
   
           
           
           
Obs 78 70 87 81 70 81 72 57 52 63 
1Reported with marginal effects 
       †These schools have at least one class with zero G/T students. 
     ‡These schools have at least one class with all G/T students. 
     
  
1
3
9
 
Table B2.9: Schools 199-209 
G/T sorting for schools 199-209 
Dependent Variable: Gifted/Talented (Probit Regression1) 
School 199 200 201 202 203† 204† 205 206 207 209 
Class 2 -0.063 0.505** -0.114 0.0842 
  
0.0233 0.0471 0.0899 0.0297 
 
(-
0.88) (2.143) (-0.90) (0.657) 
  
(0.175) (0.343) (0.556) (0.232) 
Class 3 -0.085 0.631*** -0.044 0.0185 -0.095 -0.26** -0.024 0.125 0.193 -0.113 
 
(1.13) (2.856) (-0.33) (0.142) (-0.99) (-2.49) (-0.18) (0.883) (1.133) (-0.96) 
Class 4 -0.101 0.173 -0.031 0.148 -0.035 -0.149 -0.125 
 
0.567*** -0.059 
 
(1.35) (0.624) (-0.23) (1.117) (-0.35) (-1.51) (-0.97) 
 
(3.273) (-0.48) 
Class 5 
 
0.370 0.0308 
 
0.193* -0.023 0.0689 
 
0.261 -0.093 
  
(1.534) (0.221) 
 
(1.657) (-0.21) (0.513) 
 
(1.505) (-0.77) 
Class 6 
  
-0.105 
 
-0.100 -0.085 0.182 
  
-0.211* 
      (-0.82)   (-1.04) (-0.84) (1.334)     (-1.86) 
Obs 78 63 90 63 95 113 135 57 108 118 
1Reported with marginal effects 
       †These schools have at least one class with zero G/T 
students. 
     ‡These schools have at least one class with all G/T students. 
     
  
1
4
0
 
Table B2.10 
G/T sorting for schools 210-219 
Dependent Variable: Gifted/Talented (Probit Regression1) 
School 210 211 212† 213† 214 215 216† 217 2
‡ 218 219 
Class 2 0.0284 0.0458 
  
-0.067 0.0575 
  
0.178 0.0147 
 
(0.194) (0.486) 
  
(-0.40) (0.476) 
  
(1.162) (0.114) 
Class 3 0.00 -0.087 0.0808 -0.053 0.00 0.0500 -0.0794 
 
0.329** -0.0478 
 
(-0.00) (-0.99) (0.343) (-0.42) (-0.00) (0.420) (-0.952) 
 
(2.110) (-0.371) 
Class 4 0.0835 -0.083 -0.036 0.203 0.130 0.129 -0.121 
 
0.165 0.369*** 
 
(0.586) (-0.95) (-0.17) (1.612) (0.745) (1.013) (-1.467) 
 
(1.097) (2.766) 
Class 5 0.0363 0.0123 0.109 
 
-0.150 
 
-0.00736 
 
0.165 
 
 
(0.258) (0.133) (0.530) 
 
(-0.93) 
 
(-0.081) 
 
(1.097) 
 Class 6 -0.053 
   
0.0502 
 
-0.0874 
 
0.100 
 
 
(-0.38) 
   
(0.282) 
 
(-1.071) 
 
(0.678) 
 Class 7 
      
-0.0479 
 
0.238 
 
       
(-0.561) 
 
(1.537) 
 Class 8 
        
0.178 
                   (1.162)   
Obs 120 99 44 63 89 83 122   169 92 
1Reported with marginal effects 
       2No variation in G/T status 
        †These schools have at least one class with zero G/T 
students. 
     ‡These schools have at least one class with all G/T students. 
     
  
1
4
1
 
Table B2.11 
G/T sorting for schools 220-232 
Dependent Variable: Gifted/Talented (Probit Regression1) 
School 220 222 223 224 225† 226† 
228 
2 229 230† 232 
Class 2 0.504*** 0.0660 0.00433 -0.089 
   
0.158 
 
0.199 
 
(3.238) (0.528) (0.0488) (-0.75) 
   
(1.046) 
 
(1.458) 
Class 3 0.00823 0.126 
 
-0.089 -0.067 0.00386 
 
0.156 0.201 0.248* 
 
(0.0558) (0.971) 
 
(-0.75) (-0.59) (0.0354) 
 
(0.972) (1.008) (1.799) 
Class 4 0.369** 0.161 
  
0.0590 0.192* 
 
0.370** 0.491*** 0.210 
 
(2.373) (1.242) 
  
(0.492) (1.718) 
 
(2.250) (2.609) (1.511) 
Class 5 0.0170 0.0209 
  
0.0590 
  
0.244 
 
0.128 
 
(0.114) (0.168) 
  
(0.492) 
  
(1.488) 
 
(0.974) 
Class 6 
 
0.0752 
     
0.193 
 
0.136 
    (0.592)           (1.160)   (1.020) 
Obs 109 137 43 63 80 85   110 44 130 
1Reported with marginal effects 
       2No variation in G/T status 
        †These schools have at least one class with zero G/T students. 
     ‡These schools have at least one class with all G/T students. 
     
  
1
4
2
 
Table B2.12 
G/T sorting for schools 233-262 
Dependent Variable: Gifted/Talented (Probit Regression1) 
School 233 235 236 237† 241 2 250 251 256 259 2 262 
Class 2 0.0410 0.0888 -0.0753 
  
0.276* -0.119 -0.0941 
 
0.122 
 
(0.266) (0.641) (-0.584) 
  
(1.812) (-1.001) (-0.614) 
 
(0.665) 
Class 3 -0.194 0.0455 -0.0121 
  
-0.132 -0.251** 
  
0.280 
 
(-1.283) (0.327) (-0.0920) 
  
(-0.74) (-2.438) 
  
(1.434) 
Class 4 -0.0147 
 
-0.0232 -0.0927 
  
-0.259** 
  
-0.0394 
 
(-0.097) 
 
(-0.178) (-0.892) 
  
(-2.505) 
  
(-0.219) 
Class 5 
   
-0.147 
  
-0.186* 
  
0.0700 
    
(-1.421) 
  
(-1.701) 
  
(0.376) 
Class 6 
   
0.00 
  
-0.305*** 
  
-0.0955 
    
(-0.00) 
  
(-3.015) 
  
(-0.509) 
Class 7 
   
-0.0370 
      
    
(-0.338) 
      Class 8 
   
-0.00941 
              (-0.0864)             
Obs 70 69 73 108   50 119 32   75 
1Reported with marginal effects 
       2No variation in G/T status 
        †These schools have at least one class with zero G/T students. 
     ‡These schools have at least one class with all G/T students. 
     
  
1
4
3
 
Table B2.13 
G/T sorting for schools 263-273 
Dependent Variable: Gifted/Talented (Probit Regression1) 
School 263 264 265 267† 268 269 270 271 272 273† 
Class 2 0.137 0.0825 -0.124 
 
0.0596 0.272* 0.123 0.00181 0.138 
 
 
(1.051) (0.544) (-0.89) 
 
(0.525) (1.656) (1.035) (0.0176) (1.037) 
 Class 3 -0.054 -0.053 -0.255* 
 
-0.0863 0.272* 0.184 0.0406 0.0822 
 
 
(-0.41) (-0.34) (-1.80) 
 
(-0.756) (1.656) (1.466) (0.389) (0.637) 
 Class 4 
 
0.00 
  
0.0747 0.319* 0.123 -0.0537 0.0756 -0.065 
  
(-0.00) 
  
(0.636) (1.932) (1.035) (-0.551) (0.595) (-0.71) 
Class 5 
 
0.251 
 
0.00 0.195 
 
0.0713 0.00949 0.0822 -0.053 
  
(1.542) 
 
(-0.00) (1.639) 
 
(0.623) (0.0905) (0.637) (-0.57) 
Class 6 
   
0.0866 0.0747 
 
0.123 -0.0430 0.194 -0.112 
    
(0.423) (0.636) 
 
(1.035) (-0.427) (1.398) (-1.23) 
Class 7 
   
0.102 -0.0023 
 
-0.048 0.00181 0.138 
 
    
(0.469) (-0.020) 
 
(-0.44) (0.0176) (1.037) 
 Class 8 
    
0.00987 
 
-0.048 0.0180 
  
     
(0.0832) 
 
(-0.44) (0.168) 
  Class 9 
    
0.0920 
               (0.755)           
Obs 63 90 52 43 181 91 176 165 152 88 
1Reported with marginal effects 
       2No variation in G/T status 
        †These schools have at least one class with zero G/T students. 
     ‡These schools have at least one class with all G/T students. 
     
  
1
4
4
 
Table B2.14 
G/T sorting for schools 274-284 
Dependent Variable: Gifted/Talented (Probit Regression1) 
School 274 275† 276 277† 280 281 283 284 
Class 2 0.0561 
 
0.0566 
 
-0.0422 0.0739 -0.0083 0.0214 
 
(0.582) 
 
(0.539) 
 
(-0.418) (0.521) (-0.065) (0.194) 
Class 3 -0.0474 0.102 -0.053 -0.19* -0.0976 0.150 0.0352 -0.027 
 
(-0.556) (0.774) (-0.55) (-1.88) (-0.994) (1.023) (0.276) (-0.24) 
Class 4 0.00417 -0.0640 0.0566 -0.100 0.0449 -0.097 0.138 0.0214 
 
(0.0466) (-0.517) (0.539) (-1.05) (0.416) (-0.68) (1.048) (0.194) 
Class 5 -0.0474 -0.0100 0.0566 -0.026 0.0543 0.0739 
  
 
(-0.556) (-0.080) (0.539) (-0.26) (0.492) (0.521) 
  Class 6 0.00869 
 
-0.053 
 
-0.0066 0.0739 
  
 
(0.0954) 
 
(-0.55) 
 
(-0.065) (0.521) 
  Class 7 0.134 
   
-0.0365 0.0450 
  
 
(1.288) 
   
(-0.354) (0.282) 
  Class 8 
        
         Class 9 
                          
Obs 153 90 115 102 136 123 84 78 
1Reported with marginal effects 
      2No variation in G/T status 
      †These schools have at least one class with zero G/T students. 
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